

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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20 August 1976

NO. 15

PAGE

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS	1
GENERAL	14
EASTERN EUROPE	25
WEST EUROPE	26
NEAR EAST	30
AFRICA	32
EAST ASIA	34
LATIN AMERICA	36

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DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS
SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS

CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

THE DETROIT NEWS
1 AUGUST 1976

CIA vital to U.S. security

First in a series

By COL. R.D. HEINL JR.
(USMC Ret.)
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — At its best, the CIA can listen to Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev's conversation as he rides to work, snatch secrets from three miles deep in the ocean and accurately forecast missile development seven years ahead.

At its worst it provided information which led to the fiasco invasion at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, was surprised to learn of the fall from power of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and was unaware of the 1968 Russian military action in Czechoslovakia.

The need for a national intelligence service was brought home to U.S. leaders Dec. 7, 1941, when Japanese planes swung low over the Hawaiian Islands and sank most of the Pacific fleet in less than two hours.

For the United States, it was Pearl Harbor that dramatically focused American attention on the need for a unified national intelligence service capable of putting facts together, analyzing them and informing those who could act on them.

Before World War II, we had Army intelligence, naval intelligence and diplomatic intelligence. We also were beginning to break foreign codes. But nobody was getting it together.

All the information which could have anticipated Pearl Harbor was in Washington but it was all over town in jigsaw bits and pieces with nobody to put the puzzle together. Separately, the fragments were useless.

After Pearl Harbor, Americans were determined never to be surprised again. Within a few months, under Franklin Roosevelt's leadership, we had the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), our first national intelligence agency which, in 1947, became a permanent part of the U.S. government under the title of CIA.

During the 27 years which followed — until December, 1974 — the CIA quickly rose to primacy as the world's highest-quality national intelligence agency. It pioneered the modern analytical techniques of academic intelligence, of technological intelligence, of surveillance from space. Its organization never was penetrated by a hostile "mole" (a counter spy who works his way inside an opposing intelligence agency as so vividly depicted by John Le Carre in his best-selling "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy").

In those good years, the successes of American intelligence were legendary.

- By breaking Japan's codes in 1942, the U.S. Navy smashed the Japanese fleet at Midway, avenged Pearl Harbor, and turned the Pacific war around.
- In 1953, Mohammad Mossadegh, Iran's demagogic premier, was on the verge of overthrowing the shah and joining Iraq with the Soviet Union. Within a period of weeks, in coordination with Britain's former Special Intelligence Service ("SIS", or "MI-6"), the CIA toppled Mossadegh, restored the shah to power, and pulled out its men without a ripple, thus saving Iran for the Free World.
- In the fall of 1962, American intelligence — in a confluence of research, analysis, photo-reconnaissance, and agent reports — spotted Russian nuclear missiles being

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is under attack from those who would ban spying. News military analyst Col. R. D. Heinl Jr. (USMC Ret.) explores the case for the CIA in an exclusive four-part series.



installed in Cuba.

- For nearly a decade Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a top Kremlin intelligence officer, served as an agent of the CIA and played a key role during the Cuban missile crisis.
- American intelligence gave seven years' warning on development of Moscow's anti-ballistic missile system and reported the status and design of the Soviet navy's new aircraft carriers two years before the first was launched. CIA also pinpointed eight new types of Russian ICBMs and assessed their size and capabilities three to four years before each became operational.
- American communications satellites have listened to Moscow conversations of Chairman Brezhnev while he was driving to work in his own limousine.
- Working at unprecedented ocean depths of 17,000 feet, the CIA salvaged portions of a sunken Russian nuclear submarine and would have finished the job by retrieving her cryptographic secrets, but for national exposure of the project by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson last year.

The foregoing are but samples — successes which became known, contrasted to the many which still must remain secret — but they illustrate the positive things which can emerge for the side which enjoys superior intelligence.

Despite this record of brilliant success and high performance, the CIA nonetheless has its detractors. Seymour Hersh, the New York Times reporter whose 1974 charges of "massive" CIA domestic spying triggered the intelligence community's past 18-month ordeal in Congress and the media, is quite candid. In 1975, on the David Susskind program, Hersh called for abolition of all intelligence activities.

The bad patches of intelligence over the years, the stumbles and slips which have accompanied the dazzling hits, show clearly the woes which could ensue if Hersh and like-minded foes of intelligence had their way and the United States shut its eyes to the world.

• The Berlin Wall stands to this day as a monument to Western failure to anticipate and forestall the physical division of Germany.

• If Western intelligence had divined and penetrated the 1944 bomb attempt to assassinate Hitler, the plot well might have succeeded, the war could have ended a year earlier with Russia's armies halted in Poland.

• The Bay of Pigs fiasco (a failure, to be sure, of decisions as well as intelligence) still represents our most serious hemispheric humiliation and a U.S. setback outweighed only by Vietnam.

• In 1964, the CIA, and thus the White House, was taken by surprise when Khrushchev fell.

• In 1968, when Russian tanks and paratroopers overran Czechoslovakia, the first news President Johnson had was when Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin came to the White House and told him.

• In 1973, both our own CIA and Israel's legendary Mossad, Tel Aviv's highly secret intelligence service, failed to read the signals of the Arabs' devastating Yom Kippur onslaught.

The above — like the successes recited — are only illustrations, but they demonstrate what can happen when a great power suffers intelligence failures.

If there is any concise answer to the question, "Why intelligence?" one need only look at what can happen

THE DETROIT NEWS
2 AUGUST 1976

CIA faces 27 hostile spy agencies

Second of four parts

By COL. R. D. HEINL JR.
(USMC-Ret.)
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — American intelligence has to cope with 27 hostile spy services fully deployed within the United States and ranged against the CIA throughout the world.

Russia's KGB and its military cousin, the Soviet armed forces' GRU, are big brothers to a dangerous array of smaller intelligence services including those of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and — largest among Russia's satellite spy operations — Cuba.

Besides these are the extensive networks of China, North Korea, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Arab nations. Nominally neutral, the intelligence operations of India and Yugoslavia can be counted on to help the KGB when they can.

In Langley, Va., at the secluded headquarters of CIA, stands a modest statue of Nathan Hale, America's first intelligence officer, who gave his life in the Revolution.

Similarly, yet in glaring contrast, KGB headquarters — located in the heart of downtown Moscow — dominates Dzerzhinski Square, named for the mighty Leninist spymaster, Feliks Dzerzhinski, whose giant statue, like that of Hale, serves as a signpost for the agency he founded.

Inside the seven-story yellow building are the offices of Yuri Andropov, 62, opposite number to George Bush who today heads CIA Andropov's agency, direct descendant of Lenin's Cheka and the czars' Okhrana, combines the functions of foreign intelligence with those of an internal secret police. Although Intourist guides in Moscow deny it exists, the KGB headquarters on Lubyanka Street also houses the dread Lubianka prison first made famous by Solzhenitsyn in his novel, "The First Circle."

With a budget that cannot be guessed, Andropov has more than 500,000 subordinates, the preponderance of whom are committed to internal security. He has enough intelligence operatives, however, so that, by commonly accepted estimates, upward of 50 percent of all Soviet representatives abroad are members of the KGB.

(The FBI stated recently that "over 40 percent" of all Soviet officials permanently assigned in this country, and 25 percent of all Russian exchange students here, have been identified as spies.)

(Since 1950, according to intelligence sources, some 400 Russians have been expelled from official posts in 40 countries for spying. During the last decade, U.S. records show more than 800 attempts by KGB agents to enlist American citizens as Russian agents.)

The Russian Embassy on Washington's 16th Street has more than 200 staff members and more antennas than the Pentagon. Backing up the Soviets' Washington team are nearly 250 Russians infiltrated into the UN Secretariat and nearly 100 more in the Soviet Mission to the UN.

Located a short distance from the UN, behind a brownstone front on East 67th Street, is the U.S. headquarters of Cuba's DG1 (Direccion

General de Inteligencia), the KGB's Western Hemisphere surrogate and largest and most modern intelligence service in the hemisphere except our CIA.

While the DG1's operations and makeup hitherto have been little known, it now is emerging as a main focus of Kremlin-directed subversion, terrorism and espionage directly aimed at the United States.

The DG1 in recent years has funded and trained a range of groups including Weathermen, SDS, Black Panthers, American Indian subversives, "FLQ" Quebec separatists in Canada and especially Puerto Rican revolutionaries.

Under intensive Russian tutelage, the DG1, nearly 4,000 strong, is headed by Jose Mendes Cominchis and is, in turn, effectively commanded by Gen. Viktor Semenov, chief KGB officer in Cuba.

With such enemies abroad, it would be surprising if American intelligence did not have tenacious foes imbedded inside our free society.

More precisely, ever since December, 1974, when New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh charged (and largely failed to prove) that the CIA was engaged in "massive, illegal" domestic espionage, the U.S. intelligence community has been under siege — described by CIA defenders as "McCarthyism of the left" — from an articulate, loosely affiliated cabal of hostile Americans whose orchestrated theme, in the words of one of them, is that "the CIA must be abolished."

The above objective, voiced over BBC-TV, was stated by Philip Agee, for 12 years a CIA officer, who now lives abroad for fear of prosecution because of his intentional betrayal of CIA people and operations in Latin America and elsewhere.

Besides Agee, whom the CIA bluntly calls "a defector," the anti-CIA coalition includes a few other ex-intelligence officers, ex-government officials, congressmen, journalists, radical lawyers and a miscellaneous anti-establishmentarian fringe that, in general, opposes not only the CIA but the U.S. policies and purposes it serves.

Attacks from these quarters, in turn, are supported by a range of groups including the American Civil Liberties Union, assorted anti-military radical-revisionist "think tanks" and, particularly, one cell, calling itself "Fifth Estate," expressly devoted to exposing the CIA wherever possible.

(The deadly quality of "Fifth Estate's" programs may be measured by the fact that it was they, through their quarterly bulletin, Counter-Spy, who fingered Richard S. Welch, the CIA station chief murdered in Athens by Communist terrorists last December.)

Short of abolishing the CIA, the agency's attackers demand full disclosure of all information, however sensitive, whether it embarrasses the United States abroad, destroys the agency or exposes its people to mortal harm.

If the CIA's lengthy track record of achievements were not deeply secret, it presumably would not bow under such virulent attack which closely coincides with the goals and objectives of the 27 foreign intelligence services arrayed against it.

When, in earlier times, American secrets were endangered (though nothing like today) through politically motivated domestic exposure by media and Congress claiming the highest motives, President Truman snapped:

"It matters not whether our secrets are betrayed on the front page of a U.S. newspaper or through the operations of enemy spies. In either case, the damage to the United States is the same."

WASHINGTON POST
8 AUG 1976

PARADE • AUGUST 8, 1976

Broadening the CIA

For years it was held that the Central Intelligence Agency was an elitist organization staffed almost completely by Ivy Leaguers, especially in its upper echelons.

Under Allen W. Dulles, Princeton '14, it was reported that 18 of the top 20 intelligence staffers were old Princetonians. In addition to William Colby, class of '40, who was a recent director, and Frederick M. Janney, class of '41, director of personnel, there are about 70 Princeton alumni in the employ of the CIA.

There are also a goodly number of Yale and Harvard alumni. But in recent years the agency has attempted to broaden its recruiting spectrum.

Last year it hired 400 employees from 150 different colleges and universities. This summer its 50 interns represent 35 different institutions.

"We do not concentrate our recruiting on Ivy League campuses," reports an agency spokesman. "Just look at where our employment offices are located: Austin, Boston, Denver, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Portland (Oreg.), Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, New York, and other cities."

During World War II when the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA precursor, was organized by the late Wild Bill Donovan, most of its men came from the Ivy League. Today the trend is more democratic, although the CIA top rung is still heavy with Ivy Leaguers. Incumbent CIA director George Bush is an old Yaleie.

DETROIT NEWS
3 AUGUST 1976

CIA dirty tricks fail to stir rest of world

Third of four parts

By COL. R.D. HEINL JR.
(USMC-Ret.)
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — American citizens have been shaken by the last year's parade of U.S. intelligence secrets in public but hardly anyone else in the world has been surprised by the disclosures of spying.

The reason is simple enough: In the words of the old song, "Everybody's doing it."

Not just the Russian KGB "bad guys" and their friends in surrogate intelligence services but almost every significant non-Communist country has a powerful national intelligence agency. These are backed in one way or another by effective internal security and counterespionage services and, in practically every case but the United States, by tough official secrets laws.

FBI "black bag" break-ins to steal codes from foreign embassies, CIA assassination studies, foreign destabilization and minor domestic surveillance — all these and numerous other intelligence dirty tricks fall within the rules of the game as it is played, not only by our enemies but by our friends.

Here is a rundown on intelligence services run by some other non-Communist countries.

* Ever since the 16th century, when Sir Francis Walsingham recruited young scholars from Cambridge and Oxford to spy for Queen Elizabeth in the courts of France and Spain and in Rome, Britain has ranged its intelligence services in the first line of defense beside the pound and the British fleet.

British intrigue, bribery, blackmail, abduction and subversion have overthrown governments, rulers, political parties and statesmen and destroyed careers and reputations.

That our own CIA should dabble a bit in similar matters should come as no surprise: When the United States finally entered the game in earnest during World War II, the model for our OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was Britain's famed SIS (Secret Intelligence Service, or "MI-6").

Much of the glamor of MI-6 is owing to a long, cozy relationship with the British press, which has never felt any inconsistency in serving national intelligence purposes abroad, and with the literary world: Among SIS alumni are Graham Greene, John Le Carré (real name, David Cornwell), Ian Fleming and Compton MacKenzie.

Today, Britain has three functionally compartmented intelligence services. MI-6 handles all foreign intelligence; unlike the CIA, its "C," or director, answers directly to the foreign office, which must clear all SIS operations. For large-scale dirty tricks, especially any paramilitary operations required by the intelligence community, the British army maintains a force called Special Air Service Regiment or "SAS." The original, pre-Vietnam concept and training of the U.S. Special Forces was based on the SAS.

Catching spies and protecting official secrets, whether at home or abroad, is the job of MI-6's "rival firm," designated "MI-5." In domestic cases, MI-5 (which comes under the home secretary) does the digging but Scotland Yard's Special Branch actually makes the pinch.

- In a tradition largely fostered by Charles de Gaulle, the French intelligence services have a long record of murder, kidnaping, blackmail, large-scale traffic with organized crime and internal political intrigue.

France has at least four different groups to do the jobs we expect of the CIA and FBI, as well as many we do not.

The nearest French equivalent to the CIA has the acronym, "SDECE." Its Washington headquarters may be seen in a tree-shaded mansion in the 2100 block of Wyoming Avenue. The SDECE works jointly for the defense and interior ministries.

The Directorate of Territorial Surveillances (DST) takes care of counterintelligence inside France, burgles foreign embassies and taps their phones and not infrequently spies on the press. DST comes under the interior minister.

For really dirty tricks, the French have the Civil Action Service, known widely as "Les Barbezoues" (false beards). It was the Barbezoues, for example, who pulled off the 1965 kidnap-murder of Moroccan opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka.

- The largest Western intelligence service other than the CIA is West Germany's BND. The BND, which concentrates almost exclusively on Russia and eastern Europe, is backed up in spy-catching by the FBI-like Office for Protection of the Constitution.

The BND, however, is frequently swamped — situated as it is in the front lines of European intelligence — by the massive Soviet and East German spy services whose anti-Western and anti-NATO operations are reportedly coordinated from the "Karlshorst Compound" in a heavily guarded suburb of East Berlin.

West Germany, in many ways, is the spy center of Europe. It is a divided country on the brink of the East-West chasm and it is the base for 200,000 U.S. troops with a major nuclear arsenal. It is inherently vulnerable to penetration from East Germany.

- Among a wide range of other non-Communist intelligence services, three are of special interest: South Africa's effective, ruthless Bureau of State Security (BOSS), which combines central intelligence and internal security with a judicious mix of dirty tricks elsewhere in Africa; Israel's superb and hypersecret "Mossad," which enjoys close links with the CIA; and Sweden's tightly run service which benefits from one of the toughest official secrets laws in the world. Recently, a Swedish journalist was sent to prison even for reporting in print that the Swedish service existed.

One notable difference between all the foreign agencies mentioned (except MOSSAD) and our CIA is — despite their prowess — the fact that every one, at one time or another, has suffered serious penetration by the KGB, something that has not yet happened to the CIA.

Two of the top officials in Britain's MI-6, defector Kim Philby and George Blake, were Russian double agents. Philby was next in line to become the "C" of MI-6.

As of 1968, a qualified intelligence source recently estimated, France's SDECE was "50 percent penetrated" by the KGB.

DETROIT NEWS
4 AUGUST 1976

Leftist attacks impair CIA

By COL. R. D. HEINL Jr.
(USMC-Ret.)
Navy Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — A quarter-century has passed since the State Department and the U.S. Foreign Service were under furious and deadly attack by the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy, R-Wis.

Two decades were required to rebuild American diplomacy and some of the McCarthyite wounds may not be healed in our time.

For the last 18 months — under similar onslaughts from the left — the U.S. intelligence community has been in grave danger of being crippled, dismembered or even dismantled, at a time when the United States probably has more urgent requirements for intelligence than at any time in our history.

Five committees or subcommittees of Congress and a White House commission, egged on by post-Watergate media, outdid themselves in disclosing state secrets.

The political atmosphere was hyped up by impending elections in which some of the CIA's principal inquisitors (such as Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, were avowedly seeking national exposure and national office).

A Washington magazine, Counter-Spy, was established for the sole purpose of betraying American intelligence abroad.

(The Counter-Spy program quickly found its mark: Richard S. Welch, the CIA station chief murdered in Athens by Communist terrorists, was fingered by Counter-Spy and its backers, a group calling itself Fifth Estate, largely financed by writer Norman Mailer.)

At the height of the CIA exposures — mainly by the Church and Pike committees of the Senate and House — a veteran intelligence officer told a reporter:

"If the (Russian) KGB had 500 agents working full time to neutralize the CIA on a crash basis, they couldn't achieve the results for the Kremlin that the Church and Pike committees have accomplished."

The Pike Committee in the House was headed by Rep. Otis Pike, D-N.Y.

William E. Colby, former CIA director, said:

"The KGB is still running to catch up."

Now, with the storm abating, with the contents of an ultrasecret House report on intelligence published in New York's Village Voice, with the Church Committee having put out six thick volumes totaling more than 5,000 pages of intelligence data, and with President Ford having reorganized the intelligence community with a 35-page closely printed directive, it is time to ask what damage has been done.

One who believes the damage has been "shattered"

is James Angleton, for 31 years the CIA's chief of counterespionage until he was asked to resign at the height of last year's anti-CIA frenzy. Quiet-spoken, almost academic in manner, Angleton is nonetheless blunt...

"Our files have been raided," he told a reporter. "Our agents exposed and our officials humiliated.

"The question I ask the executive and the intelligence authority is: 'Why did you permit it to happen?' The question I ask Congress is: 'Why did you make it happen and why did you want it to happen?'"

Other intelligence veterans who have also retired under pressure or in frustration ask the same questions and wince as they try to assess the damage. Counterintelligence, they say, using Angleton's adjective, has been "shattered."

So it should be that:

- Angleton and his three top deputies, representing 120 years of combined counterespionage, have been forced out.

- Foreign cooperation, once lavished on the CIA because the world knew the agency could keep a secret, has shrunk to a trickle as other intelligence services have seen their disclosures paraded by a U.S. Congress which has leaked every covert project reported by the CIA this past year.

- For the same reason that foreign sources have dried up, Americans at home and abroad who have quietly

worked to help the national intelligence service and clammed up after being exposed by Congress or the media.

- Despite official denial or minimization, those in the best position to know say the leakage of the last 18 months has been, in the words of one, "enormous." To quote Angleton again:

"The Church committee was a McCarthyite hearing in which the denigration of the intelligence community was its goal. Church exposed to the KGB and other Soviet-bloc intelligence services the personnel and methods of the American intelligence community."

One who differs with Angleton was Sen. Richard Schweiker, R-Pa., recently tapped by Ronald Reagan as his vice-presidential candidate. Schweiker called the Church hearings and disclosures "proof of our greatness as a nation."

- Able personnel have been forced out — not merely Angleton and his team. CIA Director Colby (with whom Angleton bitterly differed) in the end was sacked by President Ford in what most observers felt was an act of ritual sacrifice of an incumbent.

Will the newly created machinery for executive and congressional oversight of intelligence activities work and, above all, can Congress keep intelligence secrets?

Here the answer seems obscure at best.

As matters now stand, seven committees of Congress totaling 29 senators and more than 70 representatives have the claim to hear CIA and other intelligence disclosures. On Congress's track record to date, observers are pessimistic.

Another cause for pessimism is that one obvious end-product of the ordeal of intelligence — firm legal protection against the disclosure of its secrets — has so far failed to materialize.

Every other Western nation, including Britain, whose Official Secrets Act is toughest of all, has adequate laws against espionage and to protect its intelligence services against exposure.

The United States has neither and Congress so far shows little disposition to act on Mr. Ford's recommendations to provide the same statutory shields for intelligence information that the law has long provided for tax and census data, cotton futures, grand jury proceedings and the private communications of doctors, lawyers and reporters.

Does this mean the United States disregards and has no need for intelligence?

Never, say those who know best.

In the words of one, "Having intelligence is always better than having no intelligence at all. The alternative to acting with knowledge is acting in ignorance."

THE WASHINGTON POST

August 18, 1976

Eleanor Culver, Former CIA Aide

Eleanor Kilmain Culver, 47, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, died of cancer Sunday at Washington Adventist Hospital.

Born in Wellesley, Mass., she was a graduate of Wellesley College. She joined the CIA as a secretary shortly after coming to this area in 1949.

Mrs. Culver, who was the wife of Robert G. Culver, a Burtonsville busi-

nessman, left the CIA in the late 1950s. At that time, she was a Near East security control officer.

She had been a volunteer worker for a number of philanthropic organizations in the Laurel area, and was a member of St. Mary's Catholic Church in Laurel.

In addition to her husband, she is survived by two children, Joseph Kenneth and Mary Christine, all of the home, 16002 Kenny Rd., Laurel; two sisters, Catherine Cotter, of Wellesley, and Mrs. David Foss, of Portland, Maine, and two brothers, John Kilmain, of Wellesley, and William Kilmain, of Andover, Mass.

BALTIMORE SUN
20 Aug. 1976

CIA Reply

Sir: Your August 6 editorial, "Tip of a CIA Iceberg," demands comment.

It is not my purpose to extend discussion, if that is the word, of factual matters covered by the Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities within the United States, (Rockefeller Commission), and by the extensive studies and findings of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations.

Hundreds of pages of testimony and conclusions are available to those who wish to distinguish between evidence and suspicion, between reality and allegation, between malfeasance and sensationalism.

As a result of the Senate Select Committee proceedings, the Congress has taken steps to enhance its capacity for detailed and comprehensive oversight of the national foreign intelligence community.

Executive Order 11905 of the President provides detailed directives for the conduct of foreign intelligence activities. Thus, there is no question that the Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the intelligence community are responsive to the direction of the elected Chief Executive and fully accountable to the elected representatives in Congress.

I do not presume to comment on your editorial views. I find it necessary, however, to state that the accusations of developing techniques for "curbing domestic dissent and securing ideological conformity" are shocking, offensive, and objectionable.

Eternal vigilance of the free press as a safeguard of our freedom is one thing; unfounded imputation to the government of monstrous motives and criminal designs on a national scale is quite another. Responsible editorial opinion can hardly go too far in the exercise of the former; it is recklessly at odds with the fundamental concepts of liberty when it indulges in the latter.

Andrew T. Falkiewicz,
Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence,
Washington.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 August 1976

Tip of a CIA Iceberg

Revelations about the CIA's use of extremely dangerous hallucinogenic drugs—most of them even now classified as experimental—on unwitting and unwilling subjects in the 1950s and 1960s is frightening enough. What is even more frightening is the probability that this drug research was no more than the tip of an iceberg of CIA activity that proceeded apace despite its self-evident potential for compromising academic social science research in the United States.

What prompted the recent freedom-of-information suit that secured the CIA files was the earlier Rockefeller commission report on the CIA, which described the drug programs briefly and then mentioned, almost casually, that these programs were but a small part of a much broader program of "controlling human behavior." Indeed that seems to have been the case. The newly released files indicate that the CIA used a variety of front organizations to finance academic social scientists, and thus was involved in a far broader range of psychologically oriented research than just drugs, from electroshock to psychological assessments of subjects who were unaware they were being assessed. According to a spokesman for the Center for National Security, which brought the suit, "some of the biggest names in academic social science research were involved, usually un-

knowingly" through grants from the CIA front organizations.

It is probably safe to say that most of these researchers pursued their work with the hope of helping humanity. But although the CIA says its main interest was defensive, to counter psychological techniques it feared the Russians were developing, there is no doubt that the techniques also had, and have, frightening potentials for curbing domestic dissent and securing ideological conformity. The range of drugs tried, from aphrodisiacs to "truth serums" and what the agency called "recruitment pills," suggests the vicious potential. The agency's unscrupulous use of the techniques on unsuspecting and involuntary subjects leaves little room for confidence that the agency's ethical standards would forever have prevented use of the techniques on the general population for political purposes.

Details apparently will be scarce. Hard as it is to believe, in 1973, the then CIA director, Richard M. Helms, ordered many records of the psychological programs destroyed. Mr. Helms's order deserves to be added promptly to the already-burdensome agenda of the Senate's new intelligence committee. The nation is entitled to as full an accounting as can possibly be assembled—not only of the programs themselves but of the destruction of the files as well.

THE WASHINGTON POST
August 16, 1976

World Vision Denies CIA Connection

The charge made by an unnamed source in a story published August 9 that World Vision used street-boys cared for in our humanitarian programs in Saigon as information-collectors for the CIA is absolutely without foundation in fact and is categorically denied.

Journalistic fairness demanded a statement from World Vision in the context of the original story. The reporter, Brian Eads, admits he knew we had an office in Bangkok, yet he never contacted that office. Your own editorial office could easily have talked to our international headquarters in California. Let me state it without equivocation: World Vision has never gathered information for the CIA or any other intelligence agency. World Vision is an international Christian humanitarian organization, incorporated in the United States in 1950. We began our humanitarian and Christian ministry in South Vietnam, in 1960, and for 15 years we cared for thousands of orphans, built hundreds of homes for refugees, and worked closely with the evangelical church of that country.

Nearly 80 per cent of our present budget of \$24 million comes from

many thousands of American contributors and that the average gift to our ministries is \$19.58.

In March, 1976, I wrote an open letter to President Ford regarding the alleged use of Christian organizations and missionaries by the CIA. I said, in part: "The gospel of Jesus Christ is above cultures, above governments and above foreign policy. It must forever remain so. I urge you, Mr. President, to uphold the doctrine of church/state separation and to remove the cloud from our overseas missionary enterprises by directing the CIA to refrain from involving persons in Christian vocations in its intelligence activities."

I simply ask you if those sound like the words of an organization which would allow homeless children for whom it has provided love, a home and an education to be used as spies?

STANLEY MOONEYHAM,
President,
World Vision International,
Monrovia, Calif.

Editor's Note: We regret that a statement from World Vision was not included in The Post's original story.

NEWSWEEK
23 August 1976

THE MAFIA:

A Swim in the Bay

At 71, Mafia lieutenant John Rosselli claimed to be living the life of a retiree on the south Florida gold coast. Last month, wearing his customary tailor-made trousers and shirt, he left his sister's home in Ft. Lauderdale presumably for a routine round of golf. He never showed up. Last week—ten days after he disappeared—two fishermen thought they saw human limbs protruding from holes in a 55-gallon drum floating in Biscayne Bay. It was Rosselli: strangled, stabbed in the stomach and stuffed in a barrel wrapped with chains. Only a partial fingerprint enabled the FBI to identify his badly decomposed body.

His death carried all the signs of an old-fashioned gangland rub-out and ordinarily would have attracted only limited interest. But Rosselli was no run-of-the-mob thug. He had once worked on the side for the CIA—which recruited him to try to assassinate Fidel Castro—and he had spent several evenings with Judith Campbell Exner at about the same time that Exner was allegedly spending some of her nights on the road with President John F. Kennedy. Those links—and the fact that Rosselli recently had been talking about them to a Senate committee—again raised puzzling questions about the mobster's life and touched off demands for a full Congressional investigation into his death.

Rosselli's role as a handmaiden to the CIA was detailed last summer when he testified before Sen. Frank Church's Select Committee on Intelligence. According to Rosselli, he was contacted in 1960

by Howard Hughes' operative Robert Maheu, an ex-FBI agent, and asked to use his underworld ties to kill Castro with poison pills that could be slipped into Castro's food. Rosselli oversaw that on-and-off project until it was scrubbed by the CIA in 1963. Chicago-based mob figure Momo Salvatore (Sam) Giancana, Rosselli's boss, was also recruited for the assassination effort; he was mysteriously killed last year, days before he was to appear as a Senate witness. Earlier this year, Rosselli also talked to Sen. Richard Schweiker's subcommittee, which was probing possible connections between the Castro plot and the Kennedy assassination.

Rosselli was cooperating with the government as he tried to fend off deportation proceedings that threatened to end a long and flamboyant career. He entered the country illegally at age 6, changed his name from Filippo Sacco after a youthful narcotics arrest and joined the Capone mob in Chicago. In the '30s he became a well-known West Coast gambler with widespread contacts in the movie industry, and in 1943 he was convicted for a studio shakedown scheme. Later, still under the control of the Chicago mob, Rosselli went to Las Vegas to supervise the Mafia's gambling interests—which included casinos in Batista's Cuba. It was during that period that Rosselli was introduced to party girl Judith Campbell, whose men friends also included Giancana as well as JFK. That odd quadrangle, extending into the time of the anti-Castro plot, was also investigated, inconclusively, by the Senate committee last year.

Despite the pattern of overlapping intrigue in which Rosselli was involved, law-enforcement sources last week discounted the notion that the CIA had any

part in his death or that of Giancana: "I don't think the spooks did it," said one Federal investigator. "But I don't think they're sorry it happened." Rosselli had had a series of three meetings in early June with mobsters on the West Coast, and most official sources accepted the killings for what they seemed to be, classic underworld executions carried out for a classic underworld reason: talking too much. The logic was that anyone willing to talk to authorities about Castro might be willing to discuss other mob-related activities as well. Giancana, in fact, had already appeared before a Federal grand jury in Chicago when he was shot.

Still, Sen. Howard Baker of the intelligence committee said last week he would ask the CIA and FBI for information on the Rosselli murder and that he would urge the panel to investigate any links between Rosselli's and Giancana's killings. "There appears to be a connection," Baker said. "Both agreed to testify on the same subject. Both were involved in the same assassination operation." At the end of the week, both the Justice Department and the FBI received a green light from U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi to enter the case (it is a Federal crime to do harm to a Congressional witness). But even so, it remained to be seen whether the mystery of John Rosselli's death would ever be satisfactorily solved.

—DENNIS A. WILLIAMS with ANDREW JAFFE in Miami and ANTHONY MARRO in Washington

THE NEW YORK TIMES
14 August 1976

Levi Orders F.B.I. To Start an Inquiry On Rosselli Murder

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Aug. 13—Attorney General Edward H. Levi today ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to try to determine whether John Rosselli, the crime figure, was murdered as a result of his Senate committee testimony on assassination plots of the Central Intelligence Agency against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.

Mr. Levi was responding to requests from Senate Intelligence Committee members that the Justice Department take charge of the investigation.

A Justice Department spokesman, Robert Havel, said that Mr. Levi told the bureau "to investigate whether the Rosselli homicide was the result of his testimony before the committee or to prevent future testimony before a committee of Congress."

Mr. Rosselli's body was found last weekend in an oil drum

floating in Biscayne Bay off the Florida coast.

Mr. Roselli had testified about his role in a C.I.A. plan to use organized crime figures to kill Mr. Castro. The plan was never carried out.

Mr. Havel said Mr. Levi had authorized the bureau to enter the case under a Federal statute that makes it a crime to obstruct proceedings; before Government agencies and Congressional committees. The statute sets a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a \$5,000 fine.

The bureau director, Clarence M. Kelley, said Wednesday that department officials had advised him that there was no Federal jurisdiction in the case. Murder is not usually a Federal crime.

But Mr. Havel said Mr. Levi had now decided that there was a basis for entering the case. Mr. Levi reached the decision after "communicating with the people up on the

[Capitol] Hill to determine what Roselli had told the committee," Mr. Havel said. He did not elaborate.

The Federal investigation, Mr. Havel continued, "is to be undertaken with close cooperation and coordination with the authorities" in Dade County, Fla., which has jurisdiction over the Biscayne Bay area.

In his instructions to the bureau, Mr. Levi emphasized "that Dade County has the principal responsibility for the investigation," the spokesman said.

Meanwhile, a lawyer for Mr. Roselli today discounted the possibility of a connection between his client's death and reported recent meetings between his client and West Coast crime figures.

Mr. Roselli at one time was known as the West Coast lieutenant of the Chicago mobster Sam Giancana, who was also involved in the C.I.A. assassination plots against Mr. Castro.

Mr. Giancana was murdered in June 1975, shortly before he was to testify before the Senate investigators.

BALTIMORE SUN
10 August 1976

Colby says CIA did not kill mobsters

Miami (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency, which enlisted John Rosselli and Sam (Momo) Giancana, two mobsters, in a plot to kill Fidel Castro, played no part in their gangland-style deaths, the agency's former head said yesterday.

"I can guarantee you that the CIA had absolutely nothing to do with their deaths," William E. Colby, a former director of the agency, said in an interview with WTOP television in Washington.

Mr. Colby acknowledged that the agency had used the underworld figures in an unrealized assassination scheme against the Cuban premier in 1961. He was not in charge of the agency at the time.

WASHINGTON POST
12 AUG 1976

Who Killed John Roselli?

WE'RE GOING TO tell you a little story now. Once there was a President who was murdered. His brother was murdered too. A long time after they died some very strange facts came to light. It turned out that while they were running the government, the government was trying to get two Mafia mobsters to arrange the murder of someone else—the head of a small, hostile neighbor state. It also turned out that one brother—the one who was President—apparently had a girlfriend who was the girlfriend as well of the mobsters. And one of the mobsters, whose nickname was Momo, was prominent on the list of criminals the President's brother was trying to put in jail. The story may sound complicated, but life is complicated, and the complications in this case got even more so. For when a committee of the Congress wanted the two mobsters to come and tell them something about all this, only one of them—the one named Johnny—came. The other one, Momo, was murdered in his house a week before they wanted him to testify. Johnny, however, told his story to one committee in the Congress and then came back—quietly—to tell some more things to another committee which was in fact looking into the murder of the President. Then Johnny went to Florida. Then no one could find him. Then some fishermen found him. Dead. In an oil drum.

But we haven't told you the strangest part of all yet, the part you're really not going to believe. It is that when the great national political community of solons, scribes, policemen, spies and managers of the general wellbeing heard about poor Johnny, they said: "Oh, my goodness." Some of them went farther, of course. They said: "Fancy that!" But most of them didn't say anything at all except: "Yawn."

Forgive us for lapsing into storybookese. We do it for a reason which is that the simple unadorned facts of the John and Robert Kennedy-Fidel Castro-CIA-Mafia-Momo Giancana-Johnny Roselli-Judith Exner-Church Committee-Schweiker Committee saga need to be put forward in stark outline for their magnitude to be understood. Is it really, as the sophisticated wisdom goes, "paranoid" on our part to brood about the suggestive and possibly monstrous interconnections between all these facts and to wonder why they are not the object of intense press and government scrutiny? What accounts for the general indifference in high places? What accounts for the eagerness with which we all seem to accept that familiar tipoff that we shall be hearing no more about the latest crime—i.e., the pronouncement that Mr. Roselli's dispatch to an oil drum and Beyond had "all the earmarks of a gangland slaying." Those are the good old "earmarks" we only hear about when it is next to certain that we shall hear nothing more.

The supposition of course is that the Gang which runs gangland has its reasons and its methods and that, disagreeable as these may be, they really lie outside the proper realm of public concern because they

amount to a system of justice which 1) only affects those dumb enough to get involved in it in the first place and 2) tends only to punish those who have committed what the rest of us would regard as heinous crimes anyway. Not that these are things people say—they're things people can be expected to assume. But we think in this case the assumptions have even less validity than they would have on a clear day, which isn't much. And that is because if we know anything, we know that the Mafia operations in which Messers. Giancana and Roselli figured had become intertwined with the operations of the United States government. Never mind that the decisions of the early 1960s which made this so may rank among the most abominable decisions ever taken in the U.S. government. The plain fact is that, given the provocative and suggestive history of the two men, it is not possible for either Congress or the Executive Branch to look the other way or to complaisantly accept the earmarks-of-a-gangland-slaying bromide.

After Mr. Giancana was killed, the Church Committee inquired of the FBI whether its proposed meeting with him had figured in his murder. The FBI reported that it had no evidence to this effect. The then-director of the CIA, William Colby, felt obliged to state that the CIA had had nothing to do with the murder—and Mr. Colby likewise pronounced the other day that he was certain the CIA had not done in Mr. Roselli. The mere fact that the questions, to which these were meant to be the answers, had been raised tells us, anyway, that much more in the way of inquiry is wanted. The newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has now asked the Justice Department to make an investigation of Mr. Roselli's death. We think the Department should comply and that the investigation, despite FBI Director Clarence Kelley's disclaimer of jurisdiction, should have the Attorney General's personal attention. Such attention is needed because of the elaborate and not entirely reassuring history of relationships between the FBI and the CIA and the various participants in the whole sorry saga. We are not suggesting that any agency of government—or even any of those agency's fringe retainers—were the murderers. We are suggesting that there is an overlay of potentially embarrassing information sufficiently pervasive to keep an awful lot of people from wanting to have this thing aired. We also think that the Select Committee should reserve the right to pursue the matter. Congress, after all, can hardly be expected to sit idly by while its witnesses are being done in. Nor do we see how the public in general and the political establishment in particular can turn their attention away until we are all satisfied that a much greater effort has been made by the government—which means both the Executive Branch and the Congress—to discover what elements were at play in this series of appalling crimes and scandals.

BALTIMORE SUN
17 Aug. 1976

The Roselli Murder

Attorney General Edward H. Levi was correct to order the Federal Bureau of Investigation to look into the recent gangland-style slaying of John Roselli. He should assign this case a high priority, even take personal charge. He should also insist that there be a fuller probe than heretofore into the possibly related 1975 gangland-style slaying of Sam Giancana. But the matter can't end there. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence should also conduct a full-scale investigation.

Such unusual fact-finding is called for because it is possible that these two murders were carried out to prevent law enforcement agencies and the American people from learning the truth about an alliance of organized crime and the Central Intelligence Agency and perhaps the White House, itself, to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. It is known that such plans were at least discussed during the Kennedy administration. It

has even been suggested that President Kennedy's death was somehow related to this activity. Thus it is even possible that the murders were meant to keep secret the truth about that shattering event.

So far pursuit of this sordid business has been left mostly to those who like sensation for sensation's sake, or who do not have anything like the resources to find the truth. As a result rumors of the most outrageous sort fly to and fro. You can blame that on the quality of work done by the Warren Commission and the self-limited work done by the Senate committee. This situation is complicated by the present low regard the FBI is held in, and by the self-interest the CIA has in the case. Unless Mr. Levi and the members of the Senate Select Committee fully involve themselves in this investigation, the public is going to wonder if it is really as thorough and objective as it ought to be.

Thursday, August 12, 1976

The Washington Star

Garry Wills

Bureau of Intimidation

I have not taken the tour of the new FBI Building; but down in the basement, my son has a bullet-riddled target from a tour in the old one. I remember how our guide rattled off the amounts of information the FBI has in its files, and the efficiency with which it can retrieve that information.

Information is no good, after all, without retrievability. It is no use having material if you can't use it; and you can't use it if you can't find it, fast.

Now the Freedom Of Information Act has made it the FBI's duty to reveal what its files have to say about you and me, fellow citizens. The FBI, you see, was not interested only in criminals, but in anyone who might become a criminal — i.e., in everyone. And it went to expensive lengths gathering the weirdest bits of trivia about the strangest kinds of people.

So now we are told, by the FBI and other federal departments, that it is just too hard to find what is in the files. The FBI has denied that it had files which later turned up — and then said its retrievability was poor. It has dragged its feet, asked for more money, acquired a nine-month backlog of requests...

It has even been suggested that it is unpatriotic for citizens to ask that the Bureau or the CIA obey the law. After all, how can they do their job if we keep pestering them with requests for information?

I thought bureaus of investigation were supposed to specialize in information. But the FBI was a bureau of intimidation, of propaganda, of infiltration, of provocation — as much as, or more than, one of investigation.

Admittedly, it is expensive to retrieve information from files that were not set up for legal use in prosecution or criminal investigation but for political purposes. A CIA official even claims that it can cost \$150 just to make sure a person is not in their files.

But it costs a great deal more to gather that information — to hire the informers and equip them; to tap and bug and steal and break in. That was the true misuse of funds and time and manpower. The "expenses" in legal and moral terms is not measurable.

The Bureau was not even supposed to be an active prosecuting agency in the legal sense, just an accumulator of information usable by prosecutors. But it became an activist group in

criminal activities, setting up crimes, aiding and abetting them, and actually committing them.


I hope everyone who thinks the FBI or CIA may have snooped on him or her asks for all files affecting him or her.

It will recall both departments to their real task. Snoops need to be reminded that what they gather can be seen by those they are spying on. Such reports are often wrong, misleading, biased, prejudiced, vicious. The departments have used this as an excuse to sit on "raw files" — which means that error, stored up for official scrutiny, cannot be corrected by the innocent.

In asking for your files, be persistent. One standard dodge, I am told, is to send back a request asking, in effect: Who are you? That is a delay in itself.

One of those who got the request was a very well-known writer. A college sophomore working in the research department of a good magazine could have found out anything about him in 30 seconds. But we must be patient with our federal investigators. They are not very good at their real job. It has been such a long time since they did it.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
30 July 1976



IN THE BEGINNING was the word and the word was CIA inspired. As cold war hotted up (to mix a metaphor) a quarter of a century back the American Government secretly channelled almost limitless resources into Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty so they could channel anti-Soviet thoughts to the peoples of Eastern Europe.

For decades Washington indignantly denied that those stations — supposedly financed by the contributions of individual freedom lovers in the United States — were really bankrolled and controlled by the CIA. Three years back Nixon did a U-turn, admitted the CIA connection, and put the whole business on a new footing.

Now the stations are properly financed by Congressional grant and supervised by David Abshire, who resigned as Henry Kissinger's number two to become unpaid chairman of the official, but supposedly independent, Board for International Broadcasting.

Abshire, who was in town this week for very private talks with the Beeb and our Foreign Office, is one of those high-powered Americans who move easily between academia and politics. He runs Georgetown University's Centre for Strategic and International Studies (probably the most powerful think tank in the business) and remains an active Republican.

He is the long-shot candidate for Kissinger's post if — and they are big ifs — Ford remains President and Henry K fulfils his threat (promise?) to retire at the end of this year.

"Things have changed a great deal since we were covertly financed," Abshire said firmly when I met him yesterday. Like how? "Well, we would no longer say anything inconsistent with the declared foreign policy of the US." And what does that mean? "For a start we would never encourage any belief that a revolt in East Europe or the Soviet Union would produce a situation in which the West would intervene."

America had moved away from the days of "roll back" and "liberation." He wouldn't lie or distort at the

SCIENCE
6 AUGUST 1976

request of the State Department either, Abshire insists.

Now, says Abshire, the concentration is on fact and on violations of human rights — "the more brutal the facts, the less emotional the appeal." Since Helsinki and detente the Russians have increased their "stringent and vicious" attacks on all Western stations broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain.

"They say Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation are still CIA controlled — it's a lie and they know it." It costs the Russians \$300 millions a year to jam RFE and RL and Abshire admits with a wry grin that jamming is "rather effective — especially in the centre of cities." Even so, RFE reaches 30 million East Europeans and RL 40 million Russians a month.

Like Mrs Thatcher, Abshire is worried about growing Soviet arms expenditure. "Granted they are an empire — the largest imperial set-up in history. They are now moving for global reach on the high seas. They are seeking power far in excess of their legitimate defence needs. It bothers me deeply."

On the basis of that analysis Abshire sees a great future for his stations. "Home public opinion in Russia is in my opinion now crucial. So it is our job to get the real story on increasing Soviet arms expenditure through to the people. The free flow of information militates against totalitarianism."

And that in turn persuades him that the Soviet onslaught on the two stations is only just beginning. "They are trying to develop this thing into a post-Helsinki doctrine — all broadcasting not controlled on a direct government-to-government basis is subversive and hinders peace."

Abshire's response, not surprisingly, is to beef up Western broadcasting to the Soviet block. "America spend \$100 billions a year on defense — primarily to deter the few who rule Russia. It is amazing that so little is being done to reach the minds of the many ordinary people who are beginning to influence policy."

He is a great advocate of the Beeb's respected world service, ("in bad need of modernisation: most of its equipment is more than 20 years old") and the official US Voice of America pooling technical resources ("Nobody wants any kind of coordination of programming") with him to launch a massive new ideological onslaught on the Communist world.

It would be amazing if he had not raised such issues in London this week. Amazing too if they did not look attractive to those increasingly economy-conscious men at Bush House.

New CIA—Research, Anyone?

Mathematica Inc., one of the nation's best known private think tanks, has become a guinea pig for attempts by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct "open" research and resuscitate its languishing relations with the American academic community. Normally, CIA's outside research contracts have been kept secret.

For 2 years, Mathtech, a subsidiary of the corporation, has operated a small consulting group, called the Analytic Support Center, on the outskirts of Washington for the CIA. And although those close to the work of the center are enthusiastic about its activities, perhaps the most interesting thing about the \$600,000-per-year effort is that the fact of its existence is public knowledge.

The Analytic Support Center develops methodology for problems of strategic interest; for example, it might model likely coalitions in a multiparty political system. Into such models CIA can then feed the vast amount of information it collects on such problems, in the hope of improving on its individualistic, ad hoc, methods of analyzing them. "Our job is not to conduct the analysis. It's to develop and test the methodology," says Norman Agin, Mathtech's president.

Moreover, the center is meant to be a link between intellectuals and the CIA. The center sponsors university-type seminars at CIA headquarters (which may be attractive partly because the center's private status enables it to pay three times the \$100-per-day mandatory government consulting wage). Thomas C. Schelling, professor of political economy at Harvard, who participated in one such seminar, says he finds such arrangements "all right so long as everyone who works for them knows who they're working for. The Mathematica people told me straight away that it was for CIA."

But the experiment with open research has not been totally successful. When word of the impending CIA contract reached other parts of Mathematica, its social scientists objected strongly. Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) does more than half of the corporation's \$15-million-per-year business. MPR's reputation as a social science research organization is based on its ability to get unusually high rates of response in questioning poor people such as ghetto dwellers and welfare mothers. The fear was that such people would slam the door in interviewers' faces if Mathematica had a CIA connection.

The dispute was supposedly settled when the CIA contract was let, in November 1974, by making MPR and Mathtech into separate subsidiaries with different governing boards. However, some MPR staffers are still uneasy with the arrangement, although none can cite an actual instance where a survey has actually been hurt by knowledge of Mathematica's CIA contract.

A CIA spokesman denied that the ASC contract signals a new policy of openness in obtaining outside advice. While some contracts have been unclassified, most of the agency's dealings with the academic community remain secret. The CIA has research contracts in approximately a dozen colleges and universities; in nearly all cases, only the investigator and a "senior responsible official" of the university—usually the president—know that CIA is sponsoring the research. Moreover, according to Carl Duckett, who until recently was CIA's long-term chief of research, there are some projects that university records will show the money is coming from another government agency, such as the Department of Defense or the Department of State.

Duckett says that, while CIA usually gets permission for a proposed project from a university official, in keeping with a 1967 presidential order barring covert campus research, there are exceptions. He says that, as of early this year, he knew of one university researcher, who represents "the best brainpower in the United States," who had asked CIA not to tell his superiors that the agency supported him, for fear that he would be fired. The CIA agreed. So, after 2 years of criticism and investigation, the agency now allows an occasional public glimpse of its dealings with intellectuals and scholars. But it is still a long way from opening up such dealings to the sun-shine. —DEBORAH SHAPLEY

United States is not to protect democracy in Europe. It's to support friends of the United States, including the same kind of people that Lockheed was supporting in Japan and in Italy—not friends of democracy, but right-wingers verging on fascism.

Question. Mr. Colby, are you saying that operatives who were involved in illegal activities should be let off the hook, but if one of the operatives leaks information beforehand, making an assassination not a reality, then that person would be thrown in prison?

Colby. I think the question is really, should the CIA keep secret something that was wrong? I think President Ford has stressed several times that he will not allow secrecy to be used to keep secret something that was wrong, meaning illegal.

If it is wrong, meaning a wrong policy, it can be discussed behind closed doors with the committees of the Congress representing the American people.

Stapleton. Of course, it's interesting that you say we should not allow secrecy to hide something wrong. The only problem is, we have to find out about it first before we can know whether secrecy has been used to hide something illegal.

That's the difficulty with that formula.

On the question of assassination, take the CIA's role in the murder of Patrice Lumumba. I don't think that question has been explored adequately. It's simply not true that the people the CIA targeted for assassination somehow managed to survive. Because Patrice Lumumba did not.

Colby. Patrice Lumumba was killed by totally separate forces in Africa. It had nothing to do with any group the CIA was in touch with.

Stapleton. How do we know?

Colby. I do know. [Laughter.]

Question. Would each of the speakers comment on the Daniel Schorr matter?

Stapleton. I think what we're seeing in the attack on Daniel Schorr is an attempt by the intelligence agencies to intimidate critics of their activities.

As information has come out through people like Daniel Ellsberg and Daniel Schorr in the past few years, there has been an increasing awareness in the United States that the government has been carrying out policies which the people of this country have not been asked to approve and have not approved.

The answer of the intelligence agencies is not to open their files, to respond to the requests for information about their activities. Instead they try to create a hysteria about the threat of lost secrets and damage to our "intelligence capabilities."

I think Daniel Schorr should be defended, and

whoever leaked the information should be defended as someone who was doing an important and immeasurably valuable service to the American people.

Colby. I, of course, have already publicly defended Daniel Schorr. But I think the people who gave him the information should be punished.

Question. Mr. Stapleton, do you think the KGB does a better job in protecting the interests of Russia than the CIA?

Stapleton. I don't know, the KGB may be more or less efficient than the CIA. It isn't a matter of concern to me particularly. I think as Americans we have a problem to deal with. Our government has a problem with the CIA, which is having an inimical effect on the rights of people in this country and around the world. And that's the problem we have to deal with.

Question. Mr. Colby, are you in favor of ending all spying activities against the Socialist Workers party? And what is the CIA doing to protect us from the Democratic and Republican parties? [Sustained laughter and applause.]

Colby. I can assure you the CIA wasn't doing anything to protect you from either the Democratic or the Republican party in the United States, and I'm pretty sure that it hasn't done anything since I left.

Now, on the second part of the question. I wouldn't give any party an absolute carte blanche. I would look at the question of whether there is any foreign support or manipulation, and I would say that it is reasonable for the CIA to look at whether this is happening.

Within the United States that's the FBI's job. Outside the United States that's the CIA's job.

Stapleton. Well, there's obviously a dual standard being used here because there are certain institutions that operate overseas, like Gulf Oil, that engage in political activities in the United States and that aren't subject to surveillance and infiltration by the CIA and the FBI.

So some become a target and some don't. And I don't think the criterion is foreign links. The CIA and FBI target those people whose activities are inimical to the interests of the rulers of this country.

Question. Mr. Colby, what's the status of the files on domestic dissidents being held by the CIA?

Colby. The president of the Senate and the speaker of the House wrote me a letter asking me that I destroy nothing. I've directed my people to comply with that letter, but I also said that I hoped we would have the biggest bonfire I knew of as soon as that letter of restriction was lifted.

Stapleton. I assure you that officials of the CIA and FBI would like to have a big bonfire of all the files we haven't seen, and they're going to try and organize it as soon as possible.

Question. When should the CIA overthrow foreign governments?

Colby. In the first place, there is a perfectly practical matter. You don't overthrow a foreign government, you help somebody in that country who wants to overthrow the government do it. [Laughter.]

I think that's an important fact, because there's an image that somehow you just pull a string in Washington and—bang!—it goes. That's not true.

The second answer is when. I think it should be used sparingly.

I think there are situations, however, where a force in a country indicates it will turn the country into a force hostile to the United States, that you can perhaps avoid a more serious problem later by operating through some assistance to friends.

It's not an ideological urge to go over there and remake the world in our image. It is a matter of the direct interests of the people of the United States.

Stapleton. This is precisely the point I was trying to make earlier, that the CIA and its defenders continue to claim the right to try to overthrow governments.

And that's a very important point Mr. Colby made about how they don't try to create images of the United States around the world. That's completely true.

They don't try to establish constitutional freedoms around the world. They don't try to establish a bill of rights in Brazil or Uruguay or Greece or Chile.

The CIA is trying to support people it feels are "friends" of the United States, people like

Chiang Kai-shek, Pinochet, and the rest.

Question. I am an Iranian and I and other Iranians think that the CIA had a lot to do with the coup in Iran in 1953. I would like to know if Mr. Colby will support our right to look at CIA files and see for ourselves what the CIA has done to our country and why we don't have any democratic rights. Why we have to suffer a dictatorship. [Sustained applause.]

Colby. The Freedom of Information Act gives a citizen of the United States an opportunity to go to the government and get hold of government documents, with a few exceptions outlined in the act. I do not believe that the CIA should be responsive to every foreigner who comes to the front door and asks for a look at his files. [Applause.]

Question. For Mr. Colby: what is subversion, foreign and domestic?

Colby. I think the word subversion, there are quite a number of different definitions of it—no very precise ones. It basically means working underneath to pull out from under the structure, the things that hold something up, to penetrate it, infiltrate it, and so forth.

That's the general meaning but I don't have a pat answer for that question.

Stapleton. It's a very good point that subversion is not a very precise term. It's used by the FBI, for example, to target people for harassment whom the FBI considers "subversive." And there's no telling what they mean. It just means they want to get you.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
29 July 1976

Above The Law?

In recommending that CIA officials not be prosecuted for their participation in a 20-year program of illegal mail opening, Justice Department attorneys have advanced a shocking supporting rationale. Their argument is that, because there was "a continuum of presidential authority" for the program, under which nearly 250,000 letters were opened, lesser officials should not be held accountable. Translated into plain English, what this means is that if a series of presidents approved the violation of laws against mail tampering, then the law should not be enforced.

Actually, the Senate Intelligence Committee, after long study, said there was no documentary evidence that any president during the two decades in question (1953-1973) had ever

authorized the CIA to open letters and photograph their contents. Yet the Justice Department lawyers offered no explanation of their conclusion to the contrary.

In this case — as in the case of their recommendation that no CIA personnel be prosecuted for involvement in assassination plots — the Government lawyers seem to be saying that the CIA should be above the law. That position is an untenable one. No agency, even if buttressed by presidential authorization, should be allowed to set aside the Constitution and federal statutes enacted under it. Nor should individual federal agents feel free to ignore the law in the future on grounds that they are acting on orders from above. That extraordinarily permissive view, plainly embodied in the Justice Department recommendation, should be rejected by Attorney General Edward Levi.

LONDON TIMES
13 Aug. 1976

Join the club

I have been invited to meet yet another American author who "admits" to having been an agent—no, a "deep cover agent"—for the Central Intelligence Agency. His name is

Charles McCarry, and he has written a novel which suggests that President Kennedy was killed as revenge for the death of President Diem of South Vietnam a few weeks earlier.

It seems to me that to have been a CIA agent is nowadays almost a prerequisite for literary success, and I feel that I should try to join the club if my career is to flourish. It strikes me, though, that I might well have worked for the CIA without knowing it, assuming my cover was sufficiently deep. I have, after all, been to most of the exotic parts of the world where such agents operate. Maybe they have used me subliminally, and I should mention was much on my book-jackets.

Trying to entice me to meet McCarry, his publicity agent writes: "He is an excellent subject for interview, being a civilised, humorous and understanding person with a good turn of phrase. Coming from an old-established American family he has none of the off-putting brashness sometimes associated with Americans."

Thank heavens for that. Come to think of it, I expect that is why the CIA never called on me. Too brash. Too off-putting.

The drought situation is so bad that "we could be facing a drought situation by October," said Mr Kenneth Roberts, the authority's chief executive, yesterday.

But, I am told, there is a story about it from yesterday's Daily Telegraph.

PHS

THE WASHINGTON POST
11 August 1976

Daniel Schorr on Rights for Reporters

By John P. MacKenzie

ATLANTA—Suspended CBS newsman Daniel Schorr appealed yesterday for "an unofficial First Amendment" that would protect reporters' free press rights when reporters clash with their employers.

Schorr, in limbo with CBS News since leaking secret House Intelligence Committee report to The Village Voice six months ago, called on "large press enterprises" not to discipline reporters if they go "outside normal channels" to have information published in another medium.

He spoke at a luncheon meeting of the Individual Rights and Responsibilities section of the American Bar Association, which is holding its annual convention here. On advice of his own legal counsel—and with many legal questions with his employer and the House committee still unresolved—Schorr declined to say whether he consulted his CBS superiors before arranging for the Voice to publish long excerpts of the text of the committee's report on abuses by United States intelligence agencies.

"It has been astonishing," Schorr said, "how often I meet with important persons in the news establishment, completely ready to argue such matters as the professional necessity of acting in the face of a House resolution; the growing difficulty of reporting in the face of a secrecy backlash, the issues of disclosure versus national security and privacy—and find myself having instead to argue about the propriety of acting on my own and who owns the information I collect."

"When did freedom of the press evolve into a franchise to be exercised through large press enterprises?" Schorr asked. "What has happened to the basic concept of freedom of expression as a freedom for every American?"

Schorr admitted that his questions were "more complicated than they sound," since even reporters can waive their rights of free expression if they sign a contract giving a publisher or broadcaster control over the way they use their talents. Yet, he said, the questions should be raised and considered.

"If government should not control news," Schorr suggested, "then per-

haps no one should. The First Amendment says only that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press and speech. Perhaps it is time for some unofficial First Amendment that says no economic enterprise shall make rules abridging individual freedoms of speech and press.

"I hold that the basic purpose of the First Amendment is to promote the broadest dissemination of legitimate information through all channels—and not only established, authorized channels. I would suggest that the First Amendment is not only the news establishment's First Amendment, but it is every journalist's and every American's individual right and, what's more, individual responsibility."

In the beginning, Schorr noted, the First Amendment was aimed at protecting pamphleteers like Thomas Paine and handpress publishers in the tradition of John Peter Zenger. More recently it required "the great news empires—The Washington Post-Newsweek Company, the New York and Los Angeles Times companies, Time Inc., yes, and CBS—to stand up to the Nixon administration and vindicate the First Amendment."

Schorr did make one disclosure: Contrary to the recent testimony of Rep. James Stanton (D-Ohio), Schorr said he never told Stanton that the CIA was the source of his contraband copy of the House committee report.

He said that only CBS News inquired whether Stanton had been correct. If other news organizations had called, Schorr said, they would have been told that he recalled no such conversation with the congressman.

But any more discussion about sources might give the House Ethics Committee, which has been investigating the leak, "an erroneous expectation about the usefulness of summoning journalists" as witnesses, Schorr said. He repeated that he will not divulge his source and hopes the Ethics Committee will remain "on its side of the constitutional Great Divide" by not calling him to the witness stand.

The audience, composed of the ABA's minority of lawyers whose concern is chiefly civil rights and civil liberties, applauded Schorr warmly, apparently as much for his televised Watergate coverage as for his untelevised fight with CBS and Congress.

GENERAL

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 28, 1978

WHAT TERRORISTS HOPE TO GAIN BY MURDERING AMERICANS

Interview With Brian Crozier, A British Authority

Assassins live in a world apart, their goals perplexing to most people. To learn about the motives of violence, Robin Knight of U.S. News & World Report talked with an expert.

At LONDON

Q Mr. Crozier, what did the terrorists in Lebanon stand to gain from murdering the U.S. Ambassador?

A Normal criteria do not apply when assessing "gains" or "losses" in a terrorist action of this kind.

From the terrorist standpoint, a number of advantages result from the murder of an American ambassador in a Lebanon-type situation:

One is symbolic. In the eyes of Marxist terrorists especially, the representative of the United States stands as a symbol of the "main citadel of capitalism and imperialism." To remove him is considered a legitimate act of war.

In exactly the same way, the British Ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, was kidnaped by the Tupamaros for no personal reason but because he stood for something labeled "imperialism."

There is also what might be termed the muscle-flexing aspect. The terrorist group responsible for this particular outrage demonstrated its capacity and will to act as it did.

Finally, there's a more general spin-off. The leftist side in Lebanon is believed to be largely financed by Libya, which has a big arms pact with the Soviet Union. The Syrians who intervened, I believe genuinely, with the aim of separating the combatants are also heavily armed by the Russians. To ambush and murder the American Ambassador, his economic adviser and his Moslem chauffeur in these circumstances is to divert attention to another alleged "enemy" even though the United States is not a party to this conflict.

Q Will the murders set off another wave of terrorism?

A Not necessarily—this is a local incident. Nevertheless—and unfortunate though it is that innocent people should be endangered—it must be said that American representatives in trouble spots will continue to be at risk. Any successful terrorist action of this kind, even if the culprits are punished, must add to the risks of emulation elsewhere.

Q Do Arab states actively support world terrorism?

A Yes, indeed. The main centers in the Middle East are in Lebanon, largely because of the weakness of that state, and Syria. The Syrians have backed terrorism in a deliberate way. They're mostly concerned with the Palestinians, but they have trained others—Turks, for example.

Iraq is involved, too.

The present Libyan regime is also in the game of exporting terrorism. Indeed, Muammar Qadhafi has publicly boasted of his aid to the IRA [Irish Republican Army] and to armed organizations as far afield as the Philippines.

Q President Ford has demanded that the assassins in Lebanon be brought to justice. Yet few terrorists are ever tried for their crimes. Why is that?

A You have to distinguish between terrorism inside a country and transnational terrorism. In Northern Ireland, for example, many terrorists have been brought to trial. But although many have been tried, not all have been sentenced.

The reason is terrorism itself, which intimidates witnesses and prevents convictions.

Q But the gang who attacked the meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna has not been returned by Algeria to stand trial in Austria, has it?

A No, and there's a good reason for that. Some countries consider themselves revolutionary, and some regimes are themselves the end result of terrorist campaigns.

This is true of the Algerian Government, which achieved independence as recently as 1962 after a revolutionary war in which terrorism played a major part. This means that the Algerians are extremely reluctant to betray, as they see it, their revolutionary ideals by handing over terrorists who claim to be working for revolutionary causes.

Q Have you developed a psychological profile of a typical terrorist?

A Many terrorist groups have ideological or psychological bonds—such as the common rejection of existing society. And there's also a great impatience among young terrorists to change the system of government overnight. This, more than anything else, distinguishes terrorists even from political extremists, who prefer not to resort to violence.

To all this you must add a desire for publicity, an innate flamboyance and a complete contempt for human life. Their motivation is always that "we're going to change everything, and it doesn't matter how we do it." By the time they become terrorists, I think they have gone beyond the point where they are open to argument. What goes on in the mind of the extremists is more important than any objective reality.

Basically, they want to make people conform to their views—force them into obedience. That's why they tend to terrorize their own side. In many of the revolutionary situations I've studied, the terrorists have killed far more of their supporters than the so-called enemy.

Q Are terrorists for hire as killers or kidnappers?

A Yes, there are terrorist mercenaries—there's no question about that.

The Palestinian Black September group, for instance, has carried out murders, abductions and even drug running in return for money, in some cases paid out by Middle East governments.

Q How do terrorist groups recruit new members?

A It depends on the situation.

If you have a racial, ethnic or religious group that believes itself to be an oppressed minority, it is likely to resort to terrorism. It will attract members if it is successful and can show that in a given situation it is stronger than the authorities. It also means that those who belong to the same minority who don't want to co-operate may be coerced into doing so out of fear of reprisal.

And some people get involved out of a conviction that there is no other way but violence.

Q Are some terrorists in it just for the notoriety?

A In the last few years, a "Bonnie and Clyde" mentality has emerged, as with the Japanese Red Army and the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany. What may start as a Marxist movement rapidly becomes a group of youngish people enjoying the thrills of terrorizing cities, defying authority and living dangerously.

In fact, terrorism can become a way of life. But this is a relatively new phenomenon. Terrorism of this kind—which seems mindless and nihilistic to normal people—should be distinguished from terrorism as a phase in the lengthy process known as "revolutionary war."

This begins with the creation of a clandestine subversive apparatus, goes on to terrorism and—at least in theory—ends in a final offensive that topples a regime. I say "in theory" because in practice the process is rarely completed. The very few examples include Algeria and Indo-China—and both

were "colonial" situations.

Q Do terrorist gangs pool their funds and expertise?

A Not to any great extent. Mostly each group has its own funding organization which secures money by ordinary crimes like bank holdups or kidnaping prominent businessmen and extorting very large ransoms. They keep whatever they grab for themselves.

However, there is a great deal of information exchanged on the technological side. Any new technique that becomes available is readily handed on. And there may also be common training schemes.

For instance, there have been links between the IRA and the Basque [separatist] ETA movement in Spain, and also between the IRA and some Palestinian groups. And in an Arab training camp devoted to Palestinians, there will certainly be a proportion of other nationalities.

Similarly, in Cuba they've trained Africans in guerrilla-warfare techniques.

Q How about weapons? Are these pooled?

A The truth is the supply of arms is not really a problem for terrorists. There are so many of them around today. And some terrorist groups are now enormously rich because of their successful criminal activities. So if they're not given weapons, they can easily buy them.

There is, however, an enormous traffic in arms, particularly Russian. It's sometimes hard to say whether these Russian arms are deliberately provided to terrorists or not, because of successful clandestine techniques.

In some cases, however, we know the Russians have definitely given weapons, training and money to certain groups. Soviet arms, for instance, have gone to both the Marxist and non-Marxist wings of the IRA.

Q How much is known about the possible involvement of the Soviet Union?

A We have built up a reasonably complete picture in recent years. We now know, for instance, that the Russians have courses in terrorism for two distinct streams of candidates: those from nonruling Communist parties and those from "national-liberation movements" in "third world" countries.

BALTIMORE SUN
10 August 1976

Argentina Rejoins the Latin Nuclear Race

By AGOSTINO BONO

Buenos Aires. Argentina's decision to dust off dormant nuclear plans is reviving interest in the race with Brazil to be the first country developing nuclear weapons on the U.S. southern flank.

The race worries the U.S. as neither South American nation signed the nonproliferation treaty. Although Argentina is currently ahead, the smart money is being bet on Brazil. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London predicts Brazilian nuclear weapons testing within eight years while Argentina will need about 10 years.

Argentina inaugurated its first nuclear power plant in 1974. Brazil's first plant is scheduled to open next year. But under the previous corrupt and debt-ridden Peronist government, Argentine plans stagnated for lack of money, which also caused a disastrous brain drain. Meanwhile, Brazil's military government cut heavily into the lead. Last year it signed a \$10-billion agreement with West Germany for a crash program to buy reactors, technology and training.

Since coming to power March 24, a determined Argentine military government pledged to revive atomic plans and lure back scientists once the economy is stabilized. But this determination is not expected to be

enough. Brazil has the momentum and the stronger economic and industrial might.

The public reason for the nuclear plants is generation of needed electrical energy in both countries. The bomb threat arises because the processing of nuclear energy produces plutonium, the key ingredient for nuclear weapons. Argentina is already believed to have about 200 pounds of plutonium, and 33 pounds are needed for a bomb.

When Argentina started producing nuclear energy, "it opened the door to obtaining an atomic bomb," explained Argentine physicist Jorge Sabato. "When Brazil possesses its uranium enrichment plant, it will also have the pertinent technology to explode a nuclear bomb."

Argentina and Brazil officially deny military plans for the atom, yet strongly hint at weapons development.

Brazilian General Reynaldo Mello de Almeida, commander of the powerful first army, praised the agreement with West Germany. The treaty "will put us in the condition to avoid whatever type of pressures from other countries possessing nuclear arms and energy," he said.

The disclaimers sound unconvincing to the U.S. Rhode Island Senator John Pastore

criticized West Germany for placing a nuclear threat on the southern flank of the U.S., equating this with Soviet missiles in Cuba. The State Department tried to head off the West German-Brazilian treaty, saying it was lax on safeguards against military use.

United States opposition is viewed equally skeptically in Latin America. Latin sources say the real reasons for Washington's concern are economic and political self-interest. Politically, the U.S. wants a freeze to protect its hemispheric nuclear supremacy, many Latins argue. Economically, the U.S. is said to be angry because its companies have been losing out in the contracts. Brazil signed with the West Germans, and Argentina is buying from Canada and France.

The U.S. also "wishes to assure access to Brazil's uranium," complained Brazilian Congressman Lysaneas Maciel. The West German deal gives them special rights over \$5.1 billion worth of Brazilian uranium. Brazil and Argentina are believed to have some of the world's richest uranium deposits, and as both nations increase their nuclear capacities, less uranium will be available for U.S. purchase, one Latin argument holds.

Mr. Bono is an American free-lance correspondent covering Latin America.

The New York Times Magazine/July 18, 1976

BARGAIN WITH TERRORISTS?

Is America's no-negotiating policy a deterrent or an invitation to murder?

By Judith Miller

WASHINGTON. Rockets rip through the United States Embassy in Beirut... An American military adviser is gunned down on a street in Teheran.... In Khartoum, two American diplomats held hostage by Palestinian terrorists are riddled with machine gun bullets after demands for political concessions are not met.... Caskets containing the bodies of an American Ambassador and his economic counselor are received in Washington by President Ford to a 19-gun salute....

Although the biggest headlines in the rising incidence of international terrorism have gone to Arab actions against Israeli nationals, such as the slaying of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich and the abduction and dramatic rescue of the passengers of an Air France jet two weeks ago, American Government missions abroad have also been a primary target. In the 77 episodes from 1968 to 1975 in which hostages were held for ransom, the victims included about 30 American officials, six of whom were killed. And for nearly six years now, Washington has adhered to a policy of "no concessions" to the terrorists. It will not accede to demands put forward as a condition for the hostages' release, it will not negotiate such terms, and it will not put pressure on other Governments to yield. In the interests of deterring future terrorism, America hangs tough.

But now this rigid policy has come under fire. Critics within the State Department and elsewhere are calling for a more flexible approach—one that would permit negotiations with terrorists and, under certain circumstances, acquiescence to demands for money and political concessions to save American lives. This debate over the deterrent value of the hard-line policy has until recently been shielded from public view, but now the critics have begun to express their views more vociferously and publicly.

The Israeli rescue of 103 hijacking hostages and crew members from Entebbe Airport in Uganda has called attention to the agonizing decisions that confront American policy makers when American hostages are involved. Fortunately, terrorism is still an insignificant form of violence in terms of numbers. Between 1968 and mid-1975, only 250 people were killed in terrorist episodes—less than the annual homicide rate of any major American city. But terrorism cannot be measured by statistics. It is violence in its most pernicious form; its victims are the innocent; it is unpredictable. And its impact is all the greater because it makes one's own Government seem either helpless or heartless—unable to protect its citizens or callous in the remedies it employs.

The United States has chosen the hard-line approach well aware of its limitations and liabilities. State Department proponents of this policy know, for instance, that it is likely to make Washington seem indifferent to the safety of Foreign Service officials and American citizens abroad. The Ford Administration, nonetheless, is deeply committed

to the hard line, and the American response to terrorism is not likely to change so long as Henry Kissinger remains Secretary of State. But unrest within the State Department over the current stance is growing; there is little ground for hope that acts of terrorism involving Americans will subside in the near future, and the whole dilemma is likely to come up for reassessment by the next Administration.

In the early 60's, terrorist incidents were rare. In 1968, however, diplomatic kidnappings and attempted assassinations increased markedly in number. Among the victims that year were four American officials kidnapped and killed in Latin America and two wounded. Washington dealt with each incident as it occurred; there was no consistent policy. In some cases, the Government ignored the terrorists' demands; in others, while refusing to pay ransom, Washington pressed the Governments of the countries where the abductions took place to meet the terrorists' conditions. For example, when Ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick was kidnapped in Brazil in 1969, the United States put pressure on Brazil to free 15 "political prisoners," as demanded by the captors.

Brazil reluctantly complied, and the Ambassador was released, unharmed.

In July 1970, Dan Mitrione, an American public-safety adviser stationed in Uruguay, was abducted by the Tupamaros, the "urban guerrillas" then on the rampage in that country. In the developing drama (which has been fictionalized in the Costa-Gavras movie "State of Siege") the Uruguayan Government rejected the Tupamaros' offer to release Mitrione in exchange for a group of political prisoners. At this juncture, Washington's policy hardened. As one State Department official said, "We decided not to pressure the Uruguayans to meet the terrorists' demands. We were beginning to realize that such actions would only encourage others to use the same tactic." Efforts to rescue Mitrione were unsuccessful. His dead body was found in an abandoned car.

The number of terrorist incidents rose sharply in 1971, but it was not until the slaughter at the 1972 Olympics that the United States began to take concerted counteraction. President Nixon established a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terror-

ism, composed of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and Transportation, the Attorney General, the Ambassador to the United Nations, the directors of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., and the President's top national-security and domestic-policy aides. The committee appointed a Working Group of officials of these and other Government agencies. This group, meeting twice a week, began to lay down plans for coordinated action. What it boiled down to was "no concessions."

On the evening of March 1, 1973, that policy was put to its first major test.

In Khartoum, capital of the Sudan, eight Palestinians of the Black September terrorist faction stormed and seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy during a farewell party for the deputy chief of the American mission, George Curtis Moore. They soon released all their prisoners except two Arab diplomats, the Belgian chargé d'affaires, American Ambassador Cleo A. Noel Jr., and Moore. In exchange for the lives of these five, the Palestinians demanded the release of hundreds of "political prisoners" held in the Mideast and the West—including Sirhan Sirhan, the slayer of

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Robert Kennedy.

The Working Group in Washington assembled an emergency task force, which set up camp in the State Department's Operations Center, a communications room down the hall from the office of the Secretary of State. Telex messages from the embassy in Khartoum were speeded to various members of the Government by phone, pneumatic tube and a facsimile transmitter equipped with a scrambler to insure secrecy. President Nixon sent a Deputy Under Secretary of State, William Macomber Jr., to Khartoum to advise the Sudanese in their negotiations with Black September.

It seemed to many on the task force that there was a chance of saving the hostages' lives. A cable from the embassy in Khartoum said Black September had dropped all its demands except for what seemed to be its bedrock condition—release of 17 Palestinian guerrillas imprisoned by the Jordanian Government after the suppression of the Palestinian commando forces on Jordanian soil. Macomber and his entourage landed in Cairo. The publicity surrounding their mission appeared to have pleased the Palestinians. There were indications that they were prepared to fly to Cairo with their hostages, to continue the negotiations there.

Quite suddenly, things seemed to fall apart. Black September refused to move the talks to the Egyptian capital. Macomber, setting off for Khartoum, was diverted by a sandstorm. The guerrillas issued a "final deadline" for the release of their comrades in Jordan. The Jordanian Government refused to comply. At a White House press conference, reporters asked President Nixon about the Sirhan Sirhan demand. He replied that the United States would not give in to blackmail. "We cannot do so and we will not do so," he said. "Now, as to what can be done to get these people released, Mr. Macomber is on his way there for discussions; the Sudanese Government is working on the problem . . . but we will not pay blackmail."

The cables to the task force became increasingly ominous. The Palestinians, who, from all indications, were growing anxious and irritated, heard of Nixon's widely reported statement. Soon afterward, they permitted Ambassador Noel to speak by telephone to his embassy. Noel was told

Macomber was on his way to Khartoum from Asmara and would arrive later that evening. "That will be too late," the Ambassador said. The next morning, the Palestinians gave themselves up. The bodies of the two Americans and the Belgian were found in the basement.

The new American policy was given more official expression by the President a few days later at a State Department ceremony honoring Noel and Moore. "All of us would have liked to have saved the lives of these two brave men," Nixon said. "But they knew and we knew that in the event we had paid international blackmail, it would have saved their lives, but it would have endangered the lives of hundreds of others all over the world, because once the terrorist has a demand that is made, that is satisfied, he then is encouraged to try it again; that that is why the position of your Government has to be one, in the interest of preserving life, of not submitting to international blackmail or extortion any place in the world. That is our policy, and that is the policy we are going to continue to have."

The death of the two popular diplomats stunned the Foreign Service. For many in the State Department, the shock was followed by anger. Some felt the handling of the incident had been bungled. Several Foreign Service officers demanded a full-scale study of the Khartoum episode instead of the routine post-mortem conducted by the Working Group. Seven months later, the Rand Corporation, the California-based "think tank," was hired to review the whole question of negotiating for the release of kidnapped diplomats and to make recommendations. Khartoum was one of some 30 cases to be examined. The project was headed by Brian Jenkins, a senior Rand analyst who had long been warning the State Department of the growing threat of terrorism.

Last May, a draft of the report was issued in the form of working notes and was circulated for limited distribution within the State Department. Those familiar with the work describe it as an analysis and indictment of the hard-line policy.

One of the fundamental errors made in the Khartoum incident, according to the draft report, was Nixon's "no blackmail" statement. His

White House press conference at the time Macomber was on his way to Khartoum. "The guidance given to him [Nixon], if asked about the affair, was to remain noncommittal," Jenkins wrote, "[The] President's statement . . . suggested that there was not much to negotiate, even when Macomber arrived. . . . [Macomber's] long flight was working as a stall, which the President's statement may have effectively torpedoed." Moreover, Jenkins added, Macomber was sent half-way around the globe from Washington, with the result that no American in a position of authority arrived in Khartoum in time; sending someone closer might have made more sense. And when Macomber was dispatched, no one in Washington had a clear idea of what he was supposed to do or why he was being sent.

Among Jenkins's recommendations were that high-level Government officials remain silent during such episodes, that all official statements be checked with the task force set up to handle the crisis, and that all information to the press be screened. Even a biographical sketch listing a kidnapped diplomat's previous assignments can have a detrimental impact on his chance of survival, Jenkins argued, since he may have been accredited to a Government regarded by the terrorists as their enemy. The Working Group has accepted these recommendations and revised its guidelines accordingly. It has also agreed with his finding that greater expertise and professionalism are required, and it is expanding its membership to include psychiatrists, police specialists and others experienced in "coercive bargaining" with terrorists. The most controversial section of the study, however, deals with the efficacy of the "no-concessions" policy.

The current hard-line position, Jenkins points out, is based on the assumptions that, first, refusing to negotiate, pay ransom or make political concessions deters terrorists from kidnapping American officials; and, second, that any deviation from such a policy would lead to a proliferation of such incidents. Both in his still-classified study and in his public writings, Jenkins contends that the evidence to support these assumptions is

he reasons, has many objectives; the wringing of concessions is only one of them, and often not the most important; the terrorists may, for example, be hoping to gain publicity for their cause and project themselves as a force that merits recognition. One objective the terrorists do not have, he argues, is mass murder. "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead," he told the House International Relations Committee during hearings last summer. Their target, therefore, is not so much the hostage as the larger audience. In this sense, terrorism is theater. A hard-line policy, while it can add to the theatrical effect, can do little to deter.

Jenkins has considerable support for his views among other experts on the subject. Prof. Richard Falk, of Princeton University, told the same committee, "We don't have real evidence that deterrence works." While agreeing with Jenkins that massacring large numbers of hostages does not fall within the political terrorist's plans, Falk held that in some cases the deaths of some hostages "actually serves the interest of the terrorist group better than would the receipt of ransom demanded (release of prisoners, money, etc.)." Hence, he said, the hard-line policy can often play into the terrorists' hands.

What really deters, according to Jenkins, is not a hard line during the crisis but determined action afterward to capture and convict the terrorists. In this country, he says, there have been only 647 kidnappings for ransom in the past 30 years—and the reason is not far to seek. "If one looks at the record of ransom payment, the ransom has almost always been paid by the family. . . . [But] of the 647 cases, all but three have been solved. The F.B.I. has a better than 90 percent capture record. The conviction rate is extremely high, and the sentences are harsh." Hence the relative unpopularity of kidnapping for ransom within the United States.

This argument is supported by the American Foreign Service Association, the Foreign Service officers' "trade union." The association has established a Committee on Extraordinary Dangers to negotiate with the State Department on prob-

lems of terrorism, and there have been frequent meetings with Kissinger and his top aides. The committee has several objectives.

One is better protection for the 31,000 American officials stationed overseas—and, in that regard, much has been done already. Congress has appropriated \$20 million for closed-television monitoring systems, electronic alarms, armored cars, extra Marine guards at American Embassies and other security measures; and American officials—and businessmen living abroad—are briefed on the rudimentary precautions they should take for their own safety. Another demand is for broader medical coverage for former hostages and their families. But the committee's main complaint is against what its members see as the State Department's unwillingness to impose strong sanctions against governments that harbor terrorists or allow them to go free.

The Department's records on that score substantiate the complaint. A terrorist involved in a kidnapping has about an 80 percent chance of escaping death or capture. For those who are caught and tried, the average sentence has been only 18 months. Of the 267 international terrorists apprehended since 1970, less than half were still in jail as of September 1975. In the Khartoum case, the Black September guerrillas were convicted of murder and sentenced by the Sudanese to life imprisonment. Soon after, however, all were flown to Egypt, where they are now living under "house arrest." For a brief period, the United States Ambassador to the Sudan was withdrawn and aid was suspended. When the flap died down, normal relations were restored.

"What good is a 'hang tough' posture during a kidnapping," said a Foreign Service committee representative, "if the Department is unwilling to be firm on pressure for punishment? They're perfectly willing to sacrifice us in the name of deterrence, but unwilling to rock the diplomatic boat afterward."

As to the hang-tough policy itself, the Foreign

Service has not taken a formal position. Some of its members support it. Others are critical of it, and added their voices to the calls for a more flexible policy that were heard during a two-day conference on international terrorism sponsored by the State Department three months ago.

□

Despite the growing criticism within and outside the Government, the State Department clung to the hard-line approach in word and deed.

In May 1973, just a few months after the Khartoum incident, Terrance Leonhardy, United States Consul General in Guadalajara, was kidnapped by left-wing militants, who demanded that the Mexican authorities release 30 prisoners and read the kidnappers' communiqué over the air. According to a State Department official familiar with the episode, the United States counseled against acquiescence. But the Mexican Government complied with the demands and Leonhardy was released, unharmed.

In March 1974, the United States refused to comply with demands for money made by the kidnappers of Vice Consul John Patterson, stationed in Hermosillo, Mexico. Despite the efforts of his family to meet the demands, Patterson's body was found near Hermosillo in July.

During the crisis, Lewis Hoffacker, then head of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, reaffirmed the "no-concessions" policy in Congressional hearings. "Tactics vary in each crisis situation," he said, "but one consistent factor should be understood by all parties concerned: The United States Government will not pay ransom to kidnappers, nor will it release prisoners to satisfy blackmail demands. We advise other Governments, individuals and companies to adopt similar positions because we believe to do otherwise, will multiply terrorist attacks."

In the summer of 1975, three American students were kidnapped in Tanza-

nia. The ransom was raised by their families, and the students were released. But the American Ambassador, W. Beverly Carter Jr., was sternly reprimanded by Kissinger for his involvement in the negotiations. "It is our policy, in order to save lives and in order to avoid undue pressure on Ambassadors all over the world," Kissinger told reporters, "that American Ambassadors and officials not participate in negotiations on the release of victims of terrorists, and that terrorists know that the United States will not participate in the payment of ransom and in the negotiations for it. In any individual case, this requires heart-breaking decisions . . . but there are important issues of principle involved here."

State Department officials who support that policy insist that it does deter terrorism. They point out that other governments that have had a more flexible policy—West Germany, the Netherlands and Britain—have recently toughened their positions on negotiations and ransom payment. They argue that kidnappings of diplomats would have increased at an even steeper rate had the United States not held firm to its position. In the absence of international agreement on a code of sanctions and punishment—one man's "terrorist" is, in many instances, another man's "freedom fighter"—it should be, they contend, the obligation of each government to demonstrate to the terrorists that their tactics will be unproductive.

The hard-line approach, these officials claim, can sometimes even enhance the victim's own bargaining power. By way of example they point to the 1974 kidnapping of Barbara Hutchison, of the United States Information Agency, by terrorists in the Dominican Republic who sought the release of imprisoned comrades. She persuaded her captors to free her by convincing them that the United States would never pressure the Dominican Government to accede to their demands and that killing her would be

pointless.

Actually, the Jenkins recommendations would retain some of the benefits, real or imagined, of the present posture. A flat "no-concessions" policy, he says, limits the range of possible responses and stifles innovative action aimed at saving a hostage's life. Those managing these crisis situations, he contends, should not be forced to rule out any option in advance. Nothing should be prohibited—either negotiating formally, or bargaining informally or secretly, or even paying ransom, if it can be arranged through third parties without publicity. In other words, the United States could continue to espouse a hard line publicly, while becoming more flexible privately.

Jenkins dismisses the objection that such a two-tier policy would readily become apparent in the era of Watergate journalism. Because each incident is unique and complex, there is already a degree of ambivalence and confusion surrounding such episodes. When Col. Edward Morgan was held hostage in Beirut last year, the United States publicly refused to consider ransom. But ransom was paid—ostensibly by a group of unidentified Lebanese businessmen—and the colonel was released. While Washington officials insist that the United States did not deviate from its "no-concessions" line, they concede that speculation about the source of the funds persists. The American Government, Jenkins suggests, ought to be able to capitalize on ambivalence of this kind. "To assume that private flexibility would immediately become apparent is to assume gross stupidity and incompetence in the management of such crises."

There is another consideration that is often cited by Jenkins's supporters within the State Department—the difficulty for any government to implement a "no-concessions" policy consistently and evenhandedly. The United States would not negotiate for the lives of Noel and Moore in Khartoum, but would it refuse

to negotiate or consider ransom if the hostage were Henry Kissinger or Susan Ford?

Even Israel, regarded as an exemplar of the toughest policy possible, has negotiated with terrorists in several particularly difficult hostage episodes. After an El Al jet was hijacked to Algiers in 1968, Israel agreed to release Arab prisoners as a gesture of "goodwill" to save the plane's crew and passengers. A year later, Israel exchanged two captured Syrian Air Force pilots for two Israeli hostages of a hijacking. The Israelis were also willing to negotiate with the Palestinians for captured Israeli schoolchildren in the town of Ma'alot in 1974. In that instance, deciding the negotiations would not prove fruitful, the Israelis stormed the school and one of the terrorists sprayed the children with bullets, resulting in the death of 24.

The raid on Entebbe Airport has renewed debate within the Adminis-

tration. Some see the Israeli action as vindicating the hard-line approach. According to this view, the Israeli "negotiations" were merely a shield behind which the Government planned its bold and risky mission. Others come to the opposite conclusion. They believe the Israeli officials who insist that the negotiations were serious, and they thus see the talks as a departure from Israel's usual hard-line policy. Whatever the case—and officials here have no hard evidence to contradict the Israeli assertions of good faith—policy makers believe the Israeli response to the hijacking is not relevant to American planning and decision-making. "The option the Israelis chose," said one high-level official, "would never be possible for us." The feeling is that Israel, already a pariah to many in the United Nations, stood to lose little through such an assault, whereas the United States, as a world power, could not engage in such

unorthodox action without suffering a tremendous loss of prestige.

The United States role as superpower, Administration officials argue, also limits the retributive action that Washington can seek against nations harboring terrorists or allowing them to go free. While the United States may like to "punish" such nations, the officials say, broader foreign-policy interests often make the withholding of economic and military aid, or the withdrawal of an ambassador, counterproductive. In addition, given the year-long Congressional investigation of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, formation of special squads to hunt down and capture or kill international terrorists has been ruled out as an option. Finally, the United States has publicly supported solutions to international terrorism through the United Nations, and extreme unilateral responses such as the Entebbe mission would not be consistent

with the stated American goal of achieving an international consensus.

Therein lies the full painfulness of the dilemma. "Be more flexible, do everything possible to save our people's lives during the crisis—and come down hard afterward on the terrorists and those who support or tolerate their actions," say the critics of the present policy. "But we're already as flexible as we can be," reply the policy makers. "We communicate with the kidnappers through third parties in every way short of negotiation or bargaining. We take advantage of every option we have. The inescapable fact is that some options during and after the crisis are simply not open to us." It is also inescapable that the terrorists are becoming increasingly sophisticated, daring and innovative, and the pressure on the United States Government to match them in these attributes can only increase. ■

Monday, August 16, 1976

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Lebanese rightists join secret world terrorist talks

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

Lebanon's civil war has sparked plans for a clandestine, worldwide Maronite Christian terrorist organization, aimed at secret warfare against the Palestinian Arabs and their supporters.

The plans were discussed at a meeting in Bogota, Colombia, in July attended by a handful of Lebanese emigres from South America, West Africa, and the United States and representatives of extremist Lebanese Christian groups.

A source with direct knowledge of the Bogota meeting said the proposed organization would be activated only "if the Palestinians really get out of hand" following capture August 12 of their major stronghold in the Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp in east Beirut.

Another source with less direct knowledge described the nascent group as "having some characteristics of Israel's Mossad [the Israeli secret overseas intelligence agency], the special operations branch of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and, if you like, the former Secret Army Organization (OAS) in Algeria." The OAS was a French settler group which in 1960-62 tried unsuccessfully to block Algerian independence and later to assassinate French President de Gaulle.

Allusions to Israeli counterterror tactics may not be empty threats. Especially from

1970 to 1973, Israeli commandos tracked down and murdered confirmed or suspected Palestinian terrorist and guerrilla intelligence agents in such cities as Paris, Rome, Nicosia, and Cologne.

This was one of the Israeli responses to Palestinian and international terrorism. More recently, such terrorism is thought by the Maronites here to be the work of what they call "the international Left" — Cubans, the Japanese "Red Army," the gang headed by the Venezuelan "Carlos" and others, all of whom the Maronites now think are fighting on the side of the Palestinians against them in Lebanon.

Some, they say, were captured when the besieged Tel al-Zaatar camp was overrun. Although the Soviet KGB (secret service) has been careful to cover the tracks of any involvement in the Lebanese conflict, right-wing Christian officers told this reporter their men had captured and then killed a Russian agent or technician at Tel al-Zaatar about five weeks before its fall. He carried no identification papers, but spoke fluent Russian and

only a little broken Arabic, they added.

The Maronite group, it finally activated, might try to operate among Palestinian and other Arab emigres in Persian Gulf oil states, the Americas, and in West Africa. It would strike at sources of arms and money for Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as at extremist splinter groups.

Both leading Christian parties here, the phalange controlled by Pierre Gemayel and his sons, and the national liberals of ex-president Camille Chamoun, could furnish recruits, although the party leaderships officially frown on terrorism outside Lebanon.

An anti-Palestinian terrorist brigade might not carry an open Maronite label. It might carry heavy membership of more extremist Maronite groups like the Guardians of the Cedars and the Lebanese youth movement.

On the clerical side, the League of Maronite Monks, controlled by Father Charbel Kassis, now touring the United States to win support for the Maronite cause, would fall under suspicion of the leftists whether or not it were actually involved.

THE WASHINGTON POST

August 16, 1976

Peru's Coca: Illegal Joy-Dust for U.S.

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Foreign Service

TINGO MARIA, Peru—A light spring green in color that contrasts with the dark mat of the surrounding jungle, the fields of coca bushes here roll away over the hills to the horizon in a two-tone patchwork seamed by the muddy Huallaga River.

A visitor can have a sickly sweet Inca Kola at the Cafe El Gringo on the rutted main street and ask anybody—discreetly, of course—about the town's biggest industry, the coca leaf. It is raw material for the white joy-dust or cocaine, here called *oro blanco*, or white gold. The growing American taste for it has been a financial bonanza for Tingo Maria.

A few years back, everybody grew tea or coffee or bananas. Not anymore.

"Well, the bananas would rot sometimes before we could get them out to market, especially in the rainy season. Then disease killed the coffee crops three or four years ago, and tea really is a lot of work for very little money," said a straw-hatted farmer over his beer.

Coca, on the other hand, he continued, takes virtually no care, grows well on the seamy near-vertical hillsides and brings in six crops a year. "You just strip the leaves and then poof, another crop in 58 days," he said.

Much of the coca in Tingo Maria is legal. Peru, according to the government's National Coca Enterprise, is the world's largest producer, growing an official crop of 10,450 tons on 40,860 licensed acres, an area the size of the District of Columbia.

The actual planting is probably about 57,000 acres, however, according to the enterprise's administrator, Alejandro Costa. Drug control sources estimate the dried coca leaf production at more than double the official level—perhaps 22,000 tons, or 70 per cent of the world's crop.

Soaked with kerosene in makeshift cement-lined pits, the dried leaves yield a rubbery scum or paste of about 1 per cent of their weight. The paste is treated in clandestine laboratories in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia to become cocaine hydrochloride at half or more the weight of the paste. In other words, Peru's estimated illegal leaf production of roughly 12,000 tons alone could yield 60 tons or more of pure cocaine, and probably does. Virtually all of it goes to the United States.

The crop of legal coca leaves theoretically has another fate, although much of it probably is also made into white gold. Only 627 tons are exported, 55 tons reduced to cocaine paste for Europe where it becomes novocaine and other anesthetics. The rest goes as leaves to U.S. companies such as the Stepan Chemical Co. of New Jersey, which produces non-drug flavorings for soft drinks. "How do you think Coca-Cola got its name?" asked Costa.

The rest of the legal leaves are all officially accounted for as chewed or

made into tea by the country's 3 million native Indians, the vast majority illiterate and poverty-ridden.

Bus drivers munch the leaf with lime to stay awake on long trips. Impoverished villagers chew coca instead of food to drive away hunger-pains. Tired women carrying enormous bundles of goods to market use it to fight their fatigue. Shepherds on the high altiplano combat the cold and altitude sickness with the coca leaf's gentle stimulation. For those not hungry or tired, the leaf often seems only to make the mouth slightly numb.

"We have in mind the slow and gradual elimination of the habit of chewing," said Costa. "It will take massive education and a long time." He estimated that about 26,000 Peruvians earn a living from the coca industry, among them 3,000 distributor-businessmen and 18,000 producers. At the farm-income level it is a \$61 million a year legal business."

Some 2,500 of the producers live in and around Tingo Maria, Costa estimated. A town and district only 37 years old, with 30,000 residents, its pastel stucco and graying wood buildings occupy the only flat space for miles among jutting jungle-covered mountains on the eastern slope of the Andes.

The mountain skyline behind the town, natives like to point out, looks like a big-bellied woman lying down and is called "the sleeping beauty." Gaily painted wooden trucks, splattered with mud, rattle emptily through town after unloading dozens of peasants at the Saturday night traveling fair.

"The place is half-mafiosi," grumbled a dry-goods store manager. "They have all the money and all they buy is liquor." Dealers for the paste arrive every so often in small private planes at the dirt airstrip, several persons related, and are wined and dined at the few large coca plantations.

Most of the legal and illegal coca is grown on the same estates, enforcement officers said, with the illicit leaves concealed under false production figure documents. Recently, however, small landholders created under Peru's agrarian reform have begun converting plots of two acres or so to coca, occasionally surrounding it with screens of other crops.

"Some people changed their life-styles overnight," said Tingo Maria's government-appointed mayor, Jose Suito Medina.

The going official rate at the farm is \$1.40 a pound for dried leaves, or about \$1,100 per acre per year. That is well above the Peruvian per capita average income of about \$600. The unofficial rate, however, is \$320 for an illegal pound of coca paste—three times the legal price for the amount of leaves necessary to make it. The half-pound of cocaine it produces might in turn bring \$13,500 in street sales in the eastern United States, according to Washington officials.

The only real evidence of new wealth is the big American-made cars that jounce incongruously through the pot-

holed dirt streets. Stores are well-stocked and high-priced, but they carry goods normal in rural Peru rather than luxury items: plastic shoes for \$10, work shirts for \$5.

"Nobody wants to show off their money," said Rolando del Agua, administrator of the government-run Turistas Hotel. "But the restaurants and bars are always full, and you can never get a seat on the plane to Lima."

Mayor Suito lamented the tax revenue the government loses to the illegal coca trade. Tingo Maria's legal production of 3.8 million pounds in 1975 brought in \$185,000 in taxes at half a cent per pound, but the mayor said decent enforcement could increase the take by a third.

"I'd hire professionals and pay them well, so they couldn't be bought, give them a gun and a vehicle and have them estimate production right there on the farms. That way the growers couldn't use false papers later on."

He admitted that the job would be dangerous, noting that three persons have been killed here in coca-deal fights in the last year. He also agreed that elimination of illegal coca would cause suffering among the citizens. "I'd like to eliminate it, but what would people do then?" he asked. "Nothing grows on the land afterward."

Drug enforcement officials question the common notion that coca drains the soil of all its nutrients. They say crop substitution is a long-range project awaiting discovery of a product remotely similar in income.

But the only real industry in Tingo Maria other than coca is the Mapresa Lumber Mill and Fibreboard Factory, which employs 250 persons at \$3 a day. Around it stretch the coca fields, where ragged sharecroppers with eyes devoid of expectations tend the corps.

Some of these people were among those arrested a few months ago in a massive police raid that has grown in the retelling. Local versions now say Interpol sent 150—or was it 300?—agents disguised variously as tourists, hippies, prostitutes and businessmen into Tingo Maria to arrest more than a hundred people. Local police, laughing at the tale, said maybe two dozen people were arrested by 10 or 12 national narcotics agency officers. Everyone agrees, however, that important figures escaped, warned in advance by their local contacts.

There are four U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration men attached to the American embassy in Lima, offering case-solving advice and training programs to Peruvian officials. U.S. AID has supplied six vehicles, but no weapons or aircraft have been offered, embassy spokesmen said.

But eliminating the coca traffic does not rank high on Peru's national agenda, and the most ambitious project is a request for a U.S.-financed aerial photo study of the extent of the problem. "It's really impossible to control," said Costa. Other drug enforcement officials were more graphic. "It's like trying to empty the ocean with a sand-pail," said one.

THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 14, 1976

All Pluto's children

An act of joint self-control, please, by the world's nuclear exporters—or the spread of plutonium could produce up to 40 nuclear powers by 1985

One of the nicest things about President Amin of Uganda, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, Mr Ian Smith of Rhodesia, the Provisional IRA and the Baader-Meinhof gang is that none of them has any nuclear weapons. Not yet. If, in a few years' time, an A-bomb becomes almost as normal an item in everybody's armouries as a grenade or a sub-machinegun, the condition of mankind will be drastically changed. How could this happen? Too easily. You—or, at least, your fairly average MIT student—can design a bomb in five weeks, using only the information that is obtainable in libraries. You need only a dozen pounds of plutonium; and all over the world there are reactors blithely creating the stuff as a mere by-product of electric power, at a rate already nearing 25 tons a year.

India demonstrated two years ago just how easy it is to evade controls and use the by-product to make a bomb. And this week Mr Kissinger admitted the "high probability" that some heavy water which the Americans supplied to India for its nuclear power plants had been instrumental in producing the plutonium for India's 1974 nuclear explosion. This revelation, along with the American decision last month to sell still more uranium to India, was clearly one reason why Pakistan's Mr Bhutto would not be persuaded by Mr Kissinger this week not to buy a nuclear processing plant from France (see page 48).

Plans are now being considered in America and Britain for reducing the risk of plutonium being stolen by mixing it with uranium before stockpiling. A further idea, which the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in Washington would like to pursue, is that the used fuel rods from enriched-uranium reactors should be promptly recycled in natural-uranium ones of the Canadian type. This "tandem cycle" could reduce the rods' plutonium content to a less alarming level before they lose their protective radioactivity.

Good, but not good enough. Some potential plutonium thieves may be baffled by these devices, if and when and where they are adopted; but the pickings could still be good elsewhere, with power plants in many different countries churning out the deadly stuff and frightening quantities of it being moved around.

Such a world is not far away. President Ford gave warning on July 29th, when he issued the ACDA's latest annual report, that by 1985 there will probably be nearly 40 countries whose reactors have created enough plutonium to make bombs, in addition to the six existing members of the "nuclear club". The "near-nuclear" 40 include, by most reckonings, about 25 states that have ratified the non-proliferation treaty, thus binding themselves not to acquire the bomb and agreeing to let all their nuclear installations be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But there are at least a dozen countries that have not ratified the treaty and are thought to have the option to go nuclear by 1985 at the latest. They include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.

It cannot be assumed that the option is renounced for ever merely by ratification of the NPT—because the treaty permits withdrawal under the pressure of "extraordinary events". But this does not mean that the NPT is useless. The treaty has created a mechanism which, if operated at full power, could even now

stop the nuclear nightmare. Up to now, however, the mechanism has been worked halfheartedly and hypocritically by too many of the NPT parties—including the United States, which in Lyndon Johnson's day was the treaty's foremost champion. As a result, non-parties have actually been given incentives not to adhere to it.

The plain meaning ignored

Under the treaty, a party should not supply nuclear equipment and material to another state unless that state lets the IAEA apply its safeguards to all of the nuclear material in its possession, "for the exclusive purpose of verification of fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this treaty". To the plain man, the NPT text means, plainly, no supplies to non-parties: a highly effective device for encouraging adherence to the treaty, as nuclear equipment and reactor fuel are still exported by only a few countries (and even France, the only non-party among the exporters, has promised to behave as if it were a party). Disastrously, the Americans led the other exporters in quibbling their way round this commitment. And now the chickens have come home to roost.

The Germans and French have undertaken to sell, respectively to Brazil and Pakistan (which are not NPT parties), whole nuclear fuel cycles—not just reactors, but processing plants for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation; a virtually complete do-it-yourself kit for bomb makers. Feathers are ruffled and the roost resounds with agitated clucking. American protests at the French and German moves might, however, carry more conviction if the Americans had not recently competed—unsuccessfully—against the French for a contract to supply two big reactors to South Africa (not a treaty party), and agreed to sell a big reactor to Spain (not a treaty party), and flirted with an Indian nuclear deal.

At last year's NPT review conference the opportunity to restore the weakened treaty to strength was thrown away. Instead the major exporters furtively formed their "London club", at whose secret meetings they have done precious little to avert the proliferation of nuclear arms which they all profess to fear. Nor have they made much noticeable effort at IAEA meetings to bring about the improvement of the agency's safeguards system. At the moment an exporting state can sometimes claim that, however inadequate the safeguards it writes into its own deals may be, they are a bit tighter than the agency's.

The pass has not yet been sold outright. Given a real effort in the next year or two, including a thorough overhaul of the treaty's mechanism and the agency's safeguards system, there is still a fair chance of heading off the arrival of a world in which the bombs will be available to several dozen governments, some of them flickeringly unstable, and also to any terrorist gang that can snatch nuclear materials, or even whole weapons, from wherever they are worst guarded. But it looks as if the effort will not be made, primarily because some of the exporting states' governments will not restrain firms that are eager for profitable deals. These nuclear deals, be it noted, tend to be profitable only for the firms concerned; all too often, they somehow involve the exporting state's taxpayers in a loss. If the pass is sold, don't expect the taxpayers to pay for it.

NEW YORK TIMES

9 AUG 1976

U.S. SEES A ROLE IN INDIA'S A-BLAST

By DAVID BURNHAM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has acknowledged that it is highly probable that material supplied by the United States was used by India to become the sixth nation in the world to explode a nuclear device.

The acknowledgment by Mr. Kissinger appeared to contradict State Department assertions in June that the material in question had not played a role in the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974.

Mr. Kissinger, in a letter to Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, Democrat of Connecticut, said a "misinterpretation" of assurances by the Indian Government and of technical data had led the State Department to the incorrect conclusion that no United States materials were involved in the Indian test.

Consequently, Mr. Kissinger said, there is "a high probability" that heavy water supplied by the United States was used by India in the reactor that produced the plutonium for what India calls its "peaceful nuclear explosion."

The admission by Mr. Kissinger could affect the nuclear export policy of the United States, an area of growing diplomatic and economic importance as the number of nations using nuclear power to generate electricity increases.

The Senate Government Operations Committee, headed by Mr. Ribicoff, has already approved legislation reorganizing the procedures under which nuclear equipment and fuels are exported.

This legislation is pending before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Foreign Relations Committee. The suggestion of confusion on policy in the past has increased pressure on these committees to act.

The dispute over Indian use of American materials also is expected to play a key role with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which on July 20 held a hearing on a request for an export license for new shipments of uranium to India. The licensing has been challenged by a number of organizations, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club.

In disclosing Mr. Kissinger's letter, Senator Ribicoff said in a statement that he was deeply disturbed "because it indicated that India has misused our peaceful nuclear assistance to develop its version of an atomic bomb."

The Senator further noted that India had proceeded "with its nuclear explosion program, using plutonium derived from United States-supplied material, over the formal

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 August 1976

Soviets wary of U.S. in Indian Ocean

By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

MOSCOW
The Soviet Union is moving quietly to shore up its own hand in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf — while attributing sinister motives to U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's visit to the area earlier this week.

In a cartoon in the Aug. 10 edition of Pravda, the Soviet party newspaper, a figure in the uniform of a U.S. general is flapping down to a landing on black eagle wings, two rockets strapped to his back and two more on his feet like witch shoes. Below is a tiny island bristling with more rockets and with GIs.

The island is labeled Diego Garcia; and the line underneath the cartoon reads: "Nestling-ground of the Pentagon" (Diego Garcia is the British-owned island out in the Indian Ocean, where — by agreement with the British — the U.S. is developing naval and air facilities.)

The Pravda cartoon is a symptom of the growing Soviet concern with U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to strengthen American influence in the Indian Ocean, across which lie the world's key oil supply routes.

The cartoon appeared just as Secretary Kissinger ended his visit to the Persian Gulf region, which is linked with the Indian Ocean in strategic significance.

As Dr. Kissinger met with Pakistani leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Russians drew loud and prolonged attention here to the fifth anniversary of their own treaty of friendship with India.

As Dr. Kissinger announced new arms and economic dealings with Iran, Moscow publicized its own economic aid projects there — projects about which the Shah of Iran speaks rarely in the West, but which are growing in scope just the same.

And around the edges of the Indian Ocean, the Russians are jockeying for position in both Somalia and Ethiopia, blasting U.S. plans for Diego Garcia, and warning that the U.S. is converting Australia into a Pentagon outpost as part of a U.S. drive to regain influence and position lost with the collapse in Indo-China.

Moscow's public approach to new U.S. deals with Iran is twofold: It warns that the gulf "cannot stay aloof" from "the historical process of relaxation of international tension" in

objections of the United States."

Mr. Ribicoff charged that "our loose nuclear dealings with India set a very dangerous precedent and may, in fact, encourage other developing nations, particularly Pakistan, to misuse peaceful nuclear assistance for nuclear weapons purposes."

He said the United States, should make it clear "we will not tolerate such abuses."

The other nuclear powers at present are the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China.

Heavy Water Involved

The United States-supplied material in question was 21 tons of heavy water, an essential ingredient for transforming natural uranium into plutonium. Natural uranium cannot be used as an explosive, but small amounts of plutonium can easily be fashioned into a nuclear weapon.

the world, and quickly reiterates its own aid projects in Iran.

A recent article in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestia claimed that the Soviet Union was one of the largest purchasers of Iranian goods, and implied that Western nations were interested only in oil. Western diplomats here point out that half of the Soviet imports for the past two years has been natural gas.

Moscow uses it to replace its own gas which is sold to Western Europe.

Knowledgeable Russian sources say that there is talk of building Soviet grain silos in Iran, and that the Shah wants the output of the Isfahan steel mill boosted to 2 million tons a year.

Meanwhile, the formal Soviet reaction to new U.S. sales of military hardware to Iran and to Saudi Arabia is that Washington is trying to recoup the money it has spent on oil, and to control the entire region.

In Pakistan, the Soviets seem to favor stable Pakistani relations with India, and are working to increase trade. The Russians are selling the Pakistanis heavy machinery and are buying cotton fabrics, clothes, shoes, and carpets.

India ties valued

In India, Western observers here wonder just how far the Soviets can begin to meet India's virtually inexhaustible needs. The Russians value their ties with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, however, and are trying to extract maximum propaganda advantage from them in a week of ceremony and fanfare.

On the Horn of Africa, on the Indian Ocean's western flank, Moscow faces some delicate choices. The Somalis, who allow the Russians permanent access to Berbera, may well make some move to gain control of the strategic port of Djibouti should the French pull out of their toehold there. Any such move will be stoutly resisted by the Ethiopians, the bulk of whose outside trade flows through the port. The Ethiopians have just had their highest-ranking delegation in Moscow since the coup of two years ago removing the Emperor. Moscow responded with approving references to the "young revolutionaries."

Now the Somalis have also sent a delegation here, presumably to be reassured that they are still first in Soviet hearts — but also, Western sources believe, to hear some veiled Soviet chiding about the wisdom of their keeping the peace over Djibouti. If the Somalis do move, the Russians will be caught in a dilemma.

Meanwhile, to the southeast, Moscow has reacted frostily to the latest ANZUS meeting in Canberra between the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand, tying it with Diego Garcia and warning of dark U.S. designs on the entire Pacific Ocean.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 11, 1976

Spread of Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Sales

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10—

The disclosure that Pakistan's purchase of a nuclear reprocessing plant from France would jeopardize the sale of military jet aircraft the Pakistanis want from the United States shows the increasingly close relationship between the problems of nuclear proliferation and conventional arms sales.

By law and by Administration policy, it is now virtually established that if a country takes steps to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons, the United States will cut off all forms of aid except food. What is not clear is whether the Administration is prepared to sell conventional weapons that otherwise would not be sold as an inducement for a country not to develop nuclear armaments.

The trade-off for American leaders is this: the probability of setting off regional conventional arms races and creating imbalances is now weighed against the possibility of preventing a world filled with nuclear weapons.

So far, there is no clear-cut pattern in the way the Administration has dealt with this matter in the cases of Pakistan, Iran, South Korea and Brazil.

The weight of opinion in the Administration seems to be against selling the A-7 Corsair jet fighter-bomber to Pakistan unless the sale is the only means of getting Pakistan to

cancel its contract to buy a French nuclear reprocessing plant. Such a plant is used to separate plutonium from the spent fuel of a nuclear power plant, and the plutonium could be used to produce a nuclear weapon.

Sale Would Violate U.S. Policy

If the sale of A-7's were to be judged on its own merits, independent of the nuclear proliferation issue, most Administration experts would be strongly opposed to it. They argue that the A-7 is an attack aircraft and thus its sale to Pakistan would run counter to the Administration's policy of selling only defensive weapons to nations in the Asian subcontinent. They say that the sale would further damage American relations with India.

The prospective \$500 million sale of about 100 aircraft is, however, important to the A-7's manufacturer, The LTV Corporation officials said that without the sale LTV would have to shut down its A-7 production line.

Administration officials said that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was inclined to deal with the Pakistani case along somewhat the same lines as he had with Iran—namely, to sell the arms if that would resolve the nuclear issue.

During Mr. Kissinger's visit to Iran last weekend, Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi reportedly agreed not to purchase a reprocessing plant in return for getting an American guarantee of enriched uranium to fuel Iran's nuclear power plants and of the use of a multinationally controlled reprocessing facility.

At the same time, Mr. Kissinger and the Shah announced a \$40 billion trade package, including \$10 billion in sales of American arms to Iran.

No Denials Offered

State Department officials were very reluctant to acknowledge that there was any link between the two matters, but they did not deny it either. As one said, "We're not about to put ourselves in a blackmail position where any country can get arms out of us by threatening to buy a reprocessing plant."

A Senate staff study recently questioned the sale of many weapons systems to Iran that it said could be operated only by American personnel, and the Shah is said to want to buy even more sophisticated weapons.

In contrast with the cases of Pakistan and Iran, Administration officials insisted that no promises or even hints about future arms sales had been given to South Korea in return for the Seoul Government's agreement last January to cancel its order for a nuclear reprocessing plant from France.

As one official explained: "We simply made the negative clear to them, that if they went forward with the reprocessing plant, Congress would insist on the termination of further military credit sales. And they understood this."

Another official said, "That's right, but who's to say they won't come to us three years from now and start bargaining all over again."

Congress recently approved a law that would ban aid to any country that sold or re-

ceived uranium enrichment facilities or a reprocessing plant that was not subject to adequate safeguards. But Administration officials noted that there were several large loopholes in the language, including Presidential waiver authority, that still allowed for considerable flexibility. "In the case of South Korea, at least," an official said, "we were not about to play games; the Congressional intent was clear."

What will happen in regard to Brazil is not yet clear. Brazil has ordered an uranium enrichment facility from West Germany, but Brazil is not as dependent on or desirous of American arms as South Korea, Iran or Pakistan. Economic aid to Brazil is so small as not to be a factor either.

Thus far, the burden of the Administration's argument to Brazil and the other countries has been that reprocessing facilities are highly uneconomical, and that it is much cheaper for a country to buy nuclear fuel from the United States than to make its own. This argument seems to have carried some weight with the South Koreans and the Iranians. Whether it will continue to be persuasive is far from clear.

At this point, the overriding priority that the Administration has given to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons leads to thinking of arms sales as sweeteners. These sweeteners, some Administration officials are coming to believe, could prove almost as troublesome in the short run as the spread of nuclear weapons might become in the long run.

BALTIMORE SUN
10 August 1976

Guns for Oil

Trade is inherently healthy. Announcements of increases, regardless of the countries involved, are usually good news. But the joint Iranian-American communique of Saturday roughly trebling the estimate of trade between the two countries for the six years ending in 1980 is a disquieting exception. Unlike most trade increases, it is a tribute to American weakness and not strength. The United States is stepping up its dependence on Iranian oil and paying for it with more modern weaponry than is good for Iran or the world.

The arguments presented by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are sound in principle. Since Britain withdrew militarily from the Persian Gulf, Iran has replaced it as the paramount power and force for stability there. It is a counterweight both to the Soviet Union on its northern border and the lesser powers with Soviet arms in both the Arabian peninsula and Central Asia. Iran is a valued ally. What is frightening is the scale of armament, roughly \$2 billion worth a year in seeming perpetuity.

A staff report from the Senate foreign assistance subcommittee angered the Shah by suggesting that Iran cannot operate the sophisticated weapons it already has without American personnel. This is probably true for the time being, although the inference that Iran has lost policy independence would be untrue. Iran is no American puppet. The Shah's leadership in OPEC price-gouging is proof of that. While it is both stable and basically friendly, no one can guarantee both conditions indefinitely. Meanwhile, vastly increased armaments for Iran only whets the arms appetites of Iran's neighbors and near-neighbors, both Soviet and Soviet-supplied, provoking what it is meant to offset.

Iran has bought beyond its means in the past few years, over-estimating its oil wealth. Encouraging it to continue doing so will at least recycle petro-dollars. The estimate of \$14 billion in oil imports from Iran is a tribute to the failure of American government, industry and people to achieve a genuine conservation policy. America's waste of energy is fueling Iran's delusions of military grandeur.

LONDON TIMES
10 Aug. 1976

THE BOMBS OF THE 1980S

The United States Government is beginning to suspect that the policy, pursued for over twenty-three years, of the free sharing of information and materials for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology has been a dreadful mistake. This is reflected clearly in the arguments being put to Premier Bhutto of Pakistan by Dr Henry Kissinger to dissuade him from buying nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. That would put into the hands of the Pakistanis the capacity to obtain supplies of plutonium needed in the most direct form for nuclear-bomb making. The pressure on Premier Bhutto is more than a moral argument. Dr Kissinger is backed by new United States enabling legislation to deny military and economic aid to non-nuclear countries who are intent on producing nuclear weapons.

Serious doubts about the unwitting sabotage of the non-proliferation movement began with the Indian detonation of a so-called "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974. In the immediate months following that explosion the Americans still rejected any suggestion that their policies of the 1950s and 1960s—when atomic reactors were being sold to third world countries and thousands of foreign scientists were being trained in nuclear technology and the secrets of manufacturing plutonium—contributed to the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

In particular there were firm denials of reports that materials supplied by the United States Atomic Energy Commission had made the Indian nuclear device possible. Written replies to questions in Congress now show this not to be true: indeed the Canadians, who have been pilloried in the international public arena for providing the Indians with the basic knowledge and ingredients for their A-bomb, may in fact take

some solace from the fact that the necessary materials came from the United States.

The admission by Dr Kissinger describes how the supply of small amounts of heavy water for a research reactor of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission was probably the crucial source of material which made possible the completion of a nuclear explosion two years ago. One assessment submitted recently to President Ford lists the forty countries by 1985 could have enough plutonium from electricity generating nuclear reactors to build atomic bombs: most of these reactors have originated from the United States. The group includes West Germany, Israel, Iran, South Africa, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, East Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, and Pakistan. The analysis exposed the importance of the safeguards procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The dilemma is not exclusive to the United States. The British Government has not answered honestly questions about the supply to non-nuclear countries and non-signatories of the non-proliferation treaty of material for nuclear technology. American officials fear the halt of uranium shipments to a non-signatory country like India will mean simply that country will no longer follow even the inadequate conditions laid down by the United States as safeguards to prohibit the building of a bomb with the materials already received. A similar argument has been in progress about supplies of material from Britain to Japan which are being negotiated in the £400m contract for the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuel at Windscale. Happily, Japan has recently signed the non-proliferation treaty and therefore avoids further embarrass-

ment for the British Government. On the other hand a comparable size contract for fuel reprocessing, which would yield plutonium, has been agreed between France and Japan. The French are themselves not parties to the treaty and therefore the same obligations do not exist.

The Americans are turning the screw on their customers by insisting that when fuel from nuclear reactors—the source of plutonium for bomb-making—is ready for reprocessing it must be returned to the United States so that it cannot be stockpiled for weapons. Advisers to the American Government feel their mistake has been in believing the argument that the technology for peaceful purposes of nuclear development should belong to the world, and could be separated from military application. In practice the idea of withholding only the secrets of the actual construction of a nuclear weapon is not enough. Dr Frederick Skle, director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said recently it has taken a long time to realize that weapons design is not all that difficult.

The only way to build a barrier to prevent weapons proliferation is by controlling the availability of plutonium and enriched uranium. The myth that peaceful uses and weapons technology could be separated led to the United States declassifying a plutonium-separation system named Purex; small quantities of plutonium were actually given to foreign countries to assist them in their research and development of this process. Even now the desire to export nuclear equipment outweighs the concern of most suppliers to limit nuclear proliferation. We are creating a terrifying world for the 1980s.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 Aug. 1976

Colombo Rhetoric

It would be easy to be cynical about the fifth summit meeting of so-called nonaligned nations in Colombo this week. As usual, the "nonaligned" will include Fidel Castro's Cuba and Kim Il Sung's North Korea, among other dubious claimants. The rhetoric and resolutions are likely to be excessive, one-sided, all too familiar. The demands on the richer nations will be the same as those made at every meeting of the poorer countries, whether they convene as the nonaligned, the Group of 77 (now 112) or the third world.

Critics will say that the host, Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), could have put to better use the \$50 million spent just to prepare for the assembly of 4,000 delegates from 85 member and 25 observer nations. It might have used a \$280,000 Parliamentary appropriation to provide care and housing for Colombo's army of cripples and beggars, rather than to move them temporarily out of sight into "rehabilitation" camps outside the capital.

And yet, much of the discussion at Colombo will undoubtedly transcend the hypocrisies and focus on real problems that, in an increasingly interdependent world, inevitably affect the prosperity and well-being of the richer as well as the poorer countries: control and pricing of raw materials; conditions of trade; the necessity for rescheduling debt service for developing countries whose balance-of-payments deficits reached \$40 billion last year; the crisis confronting the World Bank's International Development Association, mostly because the United States, by far its biggest contributor, is now seriously in default on its pledges.

It is clearly impossible to meet all of the demands of the developing countries. But neither can the richer countries, in light of their own long-run interests and their stake in international peace and stability, ignore those demands. The rhetoric of Colombo will be heard again at the United Nations General Assembly next month. The task for the United States and other industrialized nations is to help sort out what is reasonable and give it more serious attention than in the past.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
15 Aug. 1976

YUGOSLAV EXILES IN BELGIUM AFRAID

**Murder of Anti-Tito Activists
Creates Apprehension
Among the Emigres**

Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, AUG. 14 — A series of murders, threats and kidnappings has created a climate of fear and suspicion in the small community of anti-Tito exiles here.

The discovery of the third and fourth Yugoslav murder victims in 18 months here this week has led most East European emigres and the authorities to suspect that the violence is possibly linked to an attempt by Yugoslavia to eradicate potential enemies to Titoist policies that could jeopardize an orderly transition after he dies.

All the victims living here have been either royalist Serbians or anti-Tito Communists. The most prominent was Vladimir Dabcevic, who had been a high-ranking member of the Tito Government but was eventually jailed for pro-Soviet tendencies. Following an escape he lived here until his mysterious disappearance last August in Rumania, and his recent trial in Belgrade when he was sentenced to a long prison term for conspiring against the Government.

Delon Murder Figure Cited

The targets this week were Miodrag Boskovic, a long-time resident here who combined the role of antique dealer and innkeeper with that of Serbian royalist activist; and Uros Milićevic, a young Yugoslav who was linked to the murder of the bodyguard of Alain Delon, the French film star, several years ago. The Belgian police are currently following various leads but are without hard clues.

They are unsure whether the main target was Mr. Boskovic for political reasons of Mr. Milićevic who confessed to having hired a killer to murder Mr. Delon's bodyguard, but was ruled insane and the alleged murderer was freed.

Mr. Boskovic was the second person connected with an exiled Serbian royalist publication, Serbia Resurrected, to have been shot to death. The editor, Peter Valic, was also slain in May 1975. Another Serbian restaurateur who had fought with Draja Mihailovich, an anti-Tito leader in World War II, was also killed in

BALTIMORE SUN
18 Aug. 1976

Israel considers refusing visas to Soviet Jews going to West

By a Sun Staff Correspondent

Jerusalem—The Israeli government is considering a proposal that it refuse to give visas to the thousands of Soviet Jews who want to leave Russia but do not want to come to Israel, though such a move probably would end any chance of emigration for them.

A second proposal under consideration would bar all international Jewish aid groups from helping Soviet Jews who do receive Israeli visas but want to go to the United States, Canada or other countries.

The two measures are meant to halt the declining immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. About half of the 1,350 Jews leaving the Soviet Union each month now choose to go to other countries.

Both proposals have been severely criticized on moral grounds during discussions here, for an Israeli immigrant's visa generally is the only way for a Jew to leave the Soviet Union.

The committee members studying the measures also have been warned that they would provide Moscow with a potential propaganda issue if they are adopted.

Yet so grave is the concern here about declining immigration in general—as many persons left Israel last year, about 20,000, as arrived—that adoption of one, perhaps both, is expected later this month, according to sources at the Jewish Agency, which administers the immigration program.

Both measures now are under study by an eight-man committee representing Israeli government agencies and the American organizations that made the desire of Soviet Jews to emigrate an international issue five years ago.

The American groups are pushing the Israeli government

to deny immigrant visas to those Soviet Jews judged likely to drop out in Vienna, a decision that could become highly arbitrary, according to sources close to the study committee.

The Israeli preference, however, would be to grant visas to most Soviet Jews wanting to emigrate but then prohibit all assistance—air fares, temporary housing, resettlement allowances and visa sponsorship—if they chose to go to another country, the sources said.

"No one wants to be in the position of bearing the burden of keeping Jews locked inside the Soviet Union," one participant in the discussions said. "The Jewish Agency does not want to become responsible for preventing as many Jews from emigrating as the KGB [Soviet secret police] has been."

But Israeli officials and international Jewish assistance organizations have been unable to come up with any alternative measures to reduce the Vienna dropout rate, which grew from about 10 per cent in 1972 to a peak of 52 per cent earlier this year.

For Israel, more is involved than just the embarrassment of being rejected by the Soviet emigrants since the country still depends heavily for its growth on a steady flow of immigrants.

One way to reduce the problem would be to curb the activities of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), an American group that virtually competes in Vienna, Rome, Brussels and other centers for Soviet Jews, according to Israeli officials.

"The scene in Vienna is unseemly, to say the least, with all the blatant promises the HIAS people make," one Jewish agency source said.

Anti-Zionist Jewish groups also have offices in Vienna and

Rome and try to convince arriving Soviet Jews not to go to Israel and provide assistance to those wanting to go to the United States instead.

Supporters of the two proposals have argued in the often heated discussions here that the continued high rate of dropouts in Vienna endangers the whole effort to persuade Soviet authorities to let Jews emigrate, for it undermines the basic rationale of family reunion and of return to a national homeland where Jews will be able to express their identity, have access to Jewish culture and be free from anti-Semitism.

They also have argued that those allowed to leave as Israeli immigrants but go instead to the United States possibly are depriving real immigrants of Soviet exit visas.

Soviet Jews who have come to Israel attribute the high dropout rate, which has been a hotly debated matter here for several months, to the often highly critical views of Israel of those who have come here and write their families back in the Soviet Union.

"Russian Jews in Israel do not understand what it means to be Jewish," said Herman Branover, an engineer who emigrated from the Soviet Union several years ago and now heads a Russian immigrant group here.

"They are rootless, have too little feeling for the land and contact with the people. So the reason for their alienation is not that things are bad here, but that they feel they do not belong."

But disenchantment is not confined to Soviet Jews—40 per cent of American, Canadian, Australian and European Jews who come to Israel as immigrants now leave within five years, according to government figures.

Brussels and parts of West Germany in the past have been described as centers of anti-Tito propaganda aimed at the hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav migrant workers in Western Europe. The Yugoslav Government has also waged a major education campaign among these expatriates, who it fears could become a source of opposition upon their return.

Western Europe

Los Angeles Times Sun., August 8, 1976

Europe's Leftists Stress Unity as Way to Achieve 'Transition to Socialism'

BY BARBARA KOEPPEL

When a battered Europe emerged from World War II a generation ago, it began rebuilding not just the rubble that once was Rotterdam, Berlin or Coventry, but also the political, economic and social order.

The course of reconstruction, had been plotted in Potsdam in 1945 with the continent split into two distinct spheres of influence. And although resentment flared in

Barbara Koeppel, a Baltimore free-lance journalist, attended a recent meeting of Socialist and Communist party functionaries in Lisbon.

some European quarters (France in the West, and Poland and Czechoslovakia in the East) at the superpowers' involvement in Europe's internal affairs, that basic division continued through the recovery period.

Now, with reconstruction complete, the old cold war ties are strained; rumblings of "national independence," and the growing power of the "left" in Southern Europe, threaten the existing order.

Spanish Communist Party leader Santiago Carillo, for instance, comparing himself to Martin Luther and Moscow to Rome, says the time has come for a break with the "church" of the Communist world. This and similar urgings by other Western European Communists for a new "Eurocommunism" are a direct challenge to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, where there certainly would be sympathetic vibrations if Communists in the West succeed in the ballot-box route to power.

For the United States and its Northern European partners, a move leftward is certain to be felt in the North as well as in Southern Europe.

Thus, each broad alliance, in East and West, determined to resist the challenge to the "order" and to its power, seeks ways to strengthen old alignments and forge new ones where needed.

The response depends on the extent of the control. The Russians, for example, to retain what leadership they have, had little choice but to sanction the principles of independence for the various European Communist parties at their meeting last June in East Berlin. The Western powers, on the other hand, are determined to counter all moves from the left. Thus a group of Western Europe's Social Democratic leaders met early this year, and with only France's Francois Mitterrand and Sweden's Prime Minister Olaf Palme abstaining, vowed a policy of noncooperation with any governments that become Communist-controlled. More recently, as West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt disclosed on his visit to the United States, three other nations besides his own—the United States, France and Britain—considered denying credit to Italy if Communists are brought into the cabinet.

Now the leaders of the left in the Mediterranean countries, long splintered by factional disputes, reason that rapidly changing conditions demand that they, too, form alliances. To this end, Socialist and Communist party functionaries from Southern Europe met recently in Lisbon to map a strategy for what they hope will be the transition to socialism.

One main theme emerged: Alliances of all sorts and at all levels are essential. With alliances, the left can win elections, and once in power, begin to transform the system to provide benefits for all in society. Without them, the left is doomed to sideline maneuvers.

In Southern Europe today, this is perhaps truer than ever as the left inches closer to power; alliances are crucial to enlarge and strengthen its constituency. Electoral success is tantalizingly close in France, where Mitterrand, the Socialist Party head and candidate for president in the 1974 elections, just missed winning by two percentage points in that election. In Italy, the Communist Party and Socialist Party together captured 44% of the vote in the June elections; in Portugal, the two parties and groups to their left polled 51% in April's parliamentary elections.

Although the type of alliances chosen will vary from country to country, the Lisbon conferees agreed that some basic coalitions must be sought. First, there must be unity of the left inside each country. Second, alliances must be forged between the parties and the mass democratic movements, and between the left and others not normally considered its allies. And looking to the future, there should be alliances among left governments in different countries—if and when they come to power—as well as new relationships among them and third world producers.

Calls for unity of the left are nothing new. But often they have been barely disguised schemes of one party or another to take power. Since no party would settle for the number two slot, the result was a left plagued and weakened by divisions.

In Portugal, for instance, the Communists and Socialists denounce each other while, as one independent Portuguese Socialist remarked, "Right-wing groups whittle away at progressive programs passed in the last two years (such as land reform and poor people's occupation of vacant housing)."

But if unity eludes the left in Portugal, some real gains are being scored in Italy, Spain and France. In France, the Communists and Socialists signed a "Common Program" in 1972, a list of Socialist goals they are publicly committed to support. Both agreed to back the other's candidates in final elections, once the weaker ones are eliminated in the primaries. The coalition appears to be strictly a marriage of convenience, but a practical leadership knows it may be their ticket to success. In Spain, where hostilities were once so great that left-wing rivals killed each other, the various left parties now have solid working alliances.

The second type of coalition brings together the "old democratic institutions" (parties and unions) and the "new" ones—town, school, workers' and neighborhood councils that are part of a mass democratic "popular" movement mushrooming in Southern Europe today. These decentralized groups, formed at the local level, originally were nonpolitical. But as their clashes with local administrations grew, they found their grievances were tied to the political and economic system.

The third type of alliance—with those not normally on the left—is not a new concept. But, as one Portuguese observed, "When the left made such pacts in the past, it was with groups themselves out of power, which needed a broader base of support. Once they regained power, the left was eased—or pushed out."

The left now seems aware that it must attract new votes, since its traditional base, the working class, is too small for a majority. Leftist leaders sense that the time is historically ripe to woo those who previously supported conservative parties, but who are becoming alienated from the system.

Out of such thought emerged the "historic compromise" in Italy, devised by the Communists and Socialists to attract the vote of the newly disaffected Catholic workers who had been loyal to the Christian Democrats. In the June elections, the Communists scored impressive gains after campaigning on an anti-existing government, anti-monopoly platform, and on a record of efficient administration of the cities they already control.

In Spain, for all those pressing for political, social and economic reform after 40 years of dictatorship, the name of the game is coalitions. The "opposition" consists of such unlikely partners as the Communist Party, various Socialist parties, progressive monarchists, conservatives, liberals, unions and people's organizations. As one opposition member observed, "After we win basic rights, the alliance will be shaky. But for now, we are united."

Another reason the left needs to reach out to those not normally its allies is to insure its own protection, to counter the pressure from those with vested interests in the present system. For despite some gains on the left, the fact remains that the centrist parties still have the largest following and majority support. And most Europeans still fear socialism in general and the Communists in particular, partly because of past heavy-handedness by the Communists.

"We must move with moderation," said Michele Achilli, an Italian Socialist, "because we must not frighten our new constituency with changes that are too radical. This could drive them into the arms of the right, and together they could defeat us."

Portugal was cited as an example of rightist forces coalescing after many Portuguese became convinced that the new and better life promised by revolutionary soldiers appeared instead to be a life of violence and dis-

order. With Portugal as the lesson in how not to succeed, the leftists believe fledgling leftist governments still can move toward "industrial, economic and social justice."

Translated, this means building a mixed economy (both a public and private sector) in the first phase of the transition process, while continually enlarging—but always with popular support—the amount of publicly owned industries and services.

And last, there is "Eurocommunism," the call in Western Europe today for the development of socialism, not just in one country, but for the entire region, and for national independence from all foreign interference.

The Lisbon conferees were convinced that any attempt to reduce foreign domination will threaten both superpowers. As one of the Spanish contingent observed, "Both Russia and America want to freeze the status quo to maintain their respective spheres of influence in Eastern and Western Europe. Therefore, detente was born."

WASHINGTON POST
5 AUG 1976

U.S. Visa Policy Puzzles Communists

Italian Cases Demonstrate Complexities, Contradictions

By Sari Gilbert

Special to The Washington Post

ROME — Two years ago when Italo Insolera, a top Italian urbanologist with leftist sympathies, returned from a brief visit to the United States, he received a phone call from the American consulate here asking him to pay a call.

"While you were in the U.S." he was told, "we received information that contrary to the statements on your visa application, you are a member of the Italian Communist Party."

Insolera, author of a well-known study of modern Rome, and a city-planning consultant for several Italian towns with leftist administrations, told the U.S. official he was not a member of the party and that how he voted was no one's business.

Although the consul he spoke with, from whom he never heard again, promised to investigate further, his visa was stamped with a huge "cancelled," causing him, Insolera said, "acute embarrassment" every time he shows his passport to cross the border into Switzerland where he teaches at the University of Geneva.

The case was never publicized and is not typical. But it points up the complexities and contradictions of current American visa policy toward Communists in a Western country like Italy, a U.S. ally, where 1.7 million citizens belong to the party and another 10 million voted for it in recent general elections.

"It's the same problem we've long had in Latin America, where almost anyone of cultural importance has past or present relations with the far left," a U.S. official said earlier this year.

To another Western diplomat, the current U.S. visa policy, based on a 1952 act of Congress, is "particularly absurd" in Italy where the Communists control more than a third of the popular vote, have recently been

awarded key positions in the Italian Parliament and are now about to give essential parliamentary support to the new minority government formed by the ruling Christian Democrats.

The State Department is currently considering a formal request last spring by the party's daily newspaper, *Unita*, to open a permanent bureau in the United States.

Visa refusals in 1975 to Giorgio Napolitano, a ranking Communist leader invited to lecture by several American universities, and to the party's chief international affairs expert, Sergio Segre, who had been scheduled to attend an academic conference on Italy, subjected U.S. policy to ridicule here and strengthened misconceptions among Italians as to just what that policy is.

A sampling of opinion of young Communist professionals who frequently travel indicated that many believe the U.S. policy now is the same as it was at the height of the Cold War. This belief appears to have led many Italian Communists to forego visits or to lie on their applications.

According to figures supplied by the U.S. consulate in Rome, however, 106 out of 110 visa applicants who were declared ineligible during the last 18 months because of Communist affiliations were later granted waivers.

Their visas, issued after they submitted a rough itinerary, did not permit the usual multiple entries and were generally limited to short periods.

Other Communists, aware that Italy does not require visas from its American visitors, have found U.S. questions regarding their political affiliations offensive. They note that the American law in no way restricts neofascist party members.

U.S. officials here make it clear that their job is to implement the 1952 McCarran Act provisions on political ineligibility.

But the State Department has some discretion that has enabled it to modify the original spirit of the law and

since the goal is no alignments, either with the East or West. But the leftists gathered in Lisbon agreed that too quick a rupture would mean retaliation. They suggested a plan for gradual disengagement, following the French and Greek models; both countries now have only formal membership, having decreased their financial support, ended participation in military maneuvers and closed bases.

Given all of the difficulties and the varying conditions in different countries, is the "transition to socialism" imminent in Europe? Not yet; premature to talk of it, the leftists meeting in Lisbon agreed. But they added that it is possible to think seriously of it.

"The key lies in the alliances," a Portuguese remarked, "and until now, the only successful coalitions have been among the right."

"A hundred years ago," he added, "Karl Marx said that without practice, there is no theory. Perhaps the two will come together at last."

which could permit other changes in the future.

According to one source, at least 10 years ago the State Department told its representatives abroad that mere membership in a communist organization was not automatically sufficient for the denial of a waiver.

U.S. Consul General Normand Redden said, "We have nothing against any party member with a valid reason to visit our country." Redden specified, however, that activities falling under the category of "party business" would not be considered valid reasons for visiting and that low-level Communists would probably find it easier to get a visa than important party leaders would.

Embassy and State Department officials have tended to be particularly cautious on applications of prominent Communists such as Napolitano and Segre because the Italian leftist press tends to interpret such events as significant changes in American policy.

When Segre finally did get a visa at the end of last year, it was for an organized visit by an all-party Italian parliamentary delegation that had no political implications.

State Department caution is likely to follow the *Unita* application too. While newspapers from Communist ruled Soviet bloc countries already are allowed to have bureaus in the United States, the opening of a permanent bureau by a non-Soviet bloc Communist news organ would be given a broad political interpretation in Italy, where the Communists appear well aware that U.S. "recognition" could greatly enhance their legitimacy.

"In addition," said one Western source, "the Communists seem to have a penchant for broaching things at the wrong time." He pointed out that the 1975 Napolitano visa request had come in the middle of an Italian election campaign, while the *Unita* application "has been made when the United States presidency is up for grabs."

SUNDAY TIMES, London
1 August 1976

Italy's Communists escape from the political ghetto

Godfrey Hodgson analyses Italy's latest government.

FOR THE THIRTY-NINTH time in the 33 years since the collapse of fascism, a new Christian Democratic prime minister has taken office in Italy.

There are still no Communist ministers in the government headed by Giulio Andreotti, which was sworn in on Friday. Yet in several specific ways the events of the past 10 days, leading up to the formation of the Andreotti government, do mark a historic advance in the status of the Italian Communist Party.

What has happened, in a single phrase, is that the Communists have escaped from the political ghetto they have inhabited since the liberation of Italy 30 years ago.

The first measure of the change that has taken place is a very simple one. For the first time, the Communists are no longer in opposition.

The reason for this is that the Andreotti government—and this, too, for the first time in the history of the Italian Republic—was formed without a majority in parliament.

The 263 Christian Democratic members elected to parliament on June 20 fall well short of a majority of the 630 members. In the past, a similar lack of a majority has not stopped successive Christian Democrats from forming governments. But in each case they have lined up, before going to parliament for a vote of confidence, enough votes to be sure of winning.

Andreotti has been unable to do this. He will, therefore, go before the Senate on Wednesday, and before the Chamber of Deputies on Monday week, to ask for the votes of confidence without which his government will be stillborn, supported only by his own Christian Democrats. He will have to rely on the 227 Communist members of parliament to abstain.

While, in accordance with the traditional subtlety of Italian politics, Andreotti has not openly asked the Communists to abstain, and the Communists have not openly promised to do so, the fact that a government has been sworn in can be taken as proof that in his several rounds of "consultation" with Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer, Andreotti has got the assurance he needs that the Communists will abstain. It can be taken as equally certain that the Communists will extract a high political price for this curious, indirect, but vital support.

Some of the details of this price were spelled out in an interview in the *Corriere della Sera* 10 days ago by a Communist leader, Senator Gerardo Chiaromonte. The Communists were asking to be consulted on a much broader range of issues than the economic programme of recovery which, everyone has agreed for many months, can be carried out only with their

support and with that of their preponderant influence in the trade unions.

The Communists now want a new broom to sweep Christian Democratic appointees out of the nationalised industries; they want fascist sympathisers removed from the police and secret services; they want administrative reforms; and they want a voice in foreign policy.

In a word, the price of their abstention is that the government should take account of their views on all major issues. And whatever subtle indications may have been exchanged in the conversations between Andreotti and Berlinguer, this is what Andreotti must have promised to do.

At first glance, it is not obvious from the electoral arithmetic why the abstention of the Communists (who won 34 per cent of the vote on June 20) against 38 per cent for the Christian Democrats) is necessary for a government to be formed.

The explanation lies in the travails of the third biggest party, the Socialist Party. In theory the abstention of the 57 Socialist members of parliament would be enough.

But the Socialist Party is deeply scarred and divided by the events of the past six months. It was they who precipitated the prolonged political crisis which led to the election, when their leader, Francesco de Martino, abruptly pulled out of a coalition with the Christian Democrats, then led by Aldo Moro as prime minister. The election was catastrophic for them, as it was for the other minor parties. The Socialists had counted on winning 15 per cent of the vote; they failed to win 10 per cent.

Two weeks ago, at the luxurious Midas Palace hotel on the outskirts of Rome, a palace revolution inside the central committee of the Socialist Party overthrew de Martino and replaced him with a young, strongly anti-Communist Socialist leader from Milan, Bettino Craxi.

In time, it is quite possible that Craxi means to bring the party back into alliance with the Christian Democrats. His chief backer is the powerful Calabrian leader, Giacomo Mancini, and Mancini is known to be a close friend, across the political trenches, with Andreotti. There is speculation that Andreotti counts on Socialist support after a special Socialist congress in the autumn.

But for the time being, it was simply impossible for Craxi and the new leadership, with the

rank and file of the party blaming their electoral collapse on more than a decade of "Centre-Left" alliance between Socialists and Christian Democrats, to be overrided by the Communists.

The Socialists could not allow a Christian Democratic government to be formed by abstaining if the Communists voted against. That is why Communist abstention was necessary before a government could be formed.

The Socialists are not the only minor party whose weakness has proved to be a problem for the Christian Democrats.

When I talked with Giovanni Galloni, one of the vice-secretaries of the Christian Democratic party, 10 days ago, he told me confidently that Andreotti would be able to put together a parliamentary majority: "Only a few votes," he said, "but enough."

Plans upset

Within 48 hours the Christian Democrat calculations were upset. First Giuseppe Saragat, the former President of the Republic who leads the Social Democratic party, with only 15 members of parliament, announced that he and his party could only at best abstain, and certainly not support Andreotti. Within hours, the Republican Party, whose best-known leader is Ugo LaMalfa, took the same position on behalf of its 14 members of parliament.

What had happened, it is now clear, was that all the minor parties—Socialists, Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals—had done so badly in the elections that they simply could not afford to be seen by their remaining supporters to be taken for granted by the Christian Democrats.

The Communists have increased their influence in another practical way. They will be playing both a more important and a more positive part in the work of this new parliament than in any of its six predecessors.

For the first time a Communist—Pietro Ingrao—will be the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. And for the first time no fewer than seven of the parliamentary committees which shape and draft legislation will be chaired by Communists.

The "historic compromise" between the Marxist and Catholic forces in Italian life, which the Communists propose and the Christian Democrats say publicly they can never accept, is not yet a reality. But the constitution of the new parliament and the situation of the new government bring it unmistakably closer.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 Aug. 1976

NEW ROME MAYOR WANTS VATICANIE

Communist-Backed Scholar Stresses Preservation of City's Cultural Heritage

By STEVEN ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

Rome, Aug. 14 — Rome's City Hall is on the Campidoglio, a magnificent public square designed by Michelangelo. Across the Tiber River stands the Vatican, home of the Sistine Chapel and other great works by the same master.

"Some distance separates us," said Prof. Giulio Carlo Argan, the city's new Mayor. "But the same genius should link us together."

Professor Argan was chosen this week as Rome's first Communist-backed Mayor, and his comments indicate the party's conciliatory approach. The Communists want to maintain ties to the Roman Catholic church, in part because these two powerful forces spring from the same soil and share the same cultural heritage.

Before the City Council elections in June, the church campaigned strenuously against the Communists and warned that Rome under Communist rule would become "a city without God." But the Communists led the balloting with 35.5 percent, while the Christian Democrats, who had governed the city continuously since World War II, trailed with 33.1 percent.

After weeks of negotiation the Socialists and Social Democrats agreed to join the Communists in a governing coalition. But since the three parties held only 39 seats in the 80-member council, they needed a promise from the three Republican members to abstain from voting.

Conciliatory Stand Taken

Some analysts here feel that this leftist front could be a model for future governments on the national level, but the Communists did not press their advantage. In a surprise move they agreed to name Professor Argan, who ran as an independent on the Communist slate, rather than one of their own party stalwarts.

The outcome of the election here meant that the Communists now control every major city on the Italian mainland. In many places they have won praise for practical problem-solving instead of ideological crusades, and in an interview this week Professor Argan struck a similar note.

As a professor of art history at the University of Rome, the new Mayor is deeply concerned with protecting the priceless monuments in the historic central city. But this problem, he said, cannot be separated from the very modern maladies afflicting the city — overcrowding, noise, pollution,

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18, 1976

Marxist Road to Rome

By C. L. Sulzberger

"Rome has spread like an oil slick, mainly because of land speculation," he asserted. "The historic center is crushed under the weight of the new urban structures. They are the real dangers hovering over Rome."

City Deep in Debt

Yet with all the recent building, about 600,000 of Rome's 3 million people lack adequate housing. At the same time, the city has accumulated a huge debt of about \$5 billion.

Professor Argan offered no panaceas, but he did offer an approach. "Sobriety, correctness, seriousness and application of the law perhaps will not create much excitement at first, but we are not looking for excitement," he said. "We are looking to administer correctly."

The new Mayor is 67 years old, a serious man with a warm, slow smile that eventually illuminates his whole face. A few samples of the city's artistic and religious heritage hung on the walls of his office: a Rubens portrait of Saint Francis, Francesco Bassano's picture of the Annunciation.

A Teacher for 40 Years

A native of Turin, Professor Argan has been teaching art history for more than 40 years and enjoys high reputation among both students and scholars. Asked why he had taken such a demanding job as the mayorality, at a time when most men would be contemplating retirement, he answered:

"Building speculators are the enemy of the city, and the Communists are the enemy of the speculators."

The mayor describes himself as a friend and disciple of Lewis Mumford, the urban critic and planner, whose works include "The Culture of Cities."

ATLANTA — The Italian people, whose wide variety of genius has never included a talent for self-government since old Roman days, have now devised an extraordinary ramshackle system to help their nation out of its terrible crisis. This is no less than the formation of a government which excludes the Communist Party from all its ministries but which depends wholly upon at least tacit Communist support to get anything at all done.

Only with the backing of those they openly distrust can the Christian Democrats succeed in climbing out of an abyss of inflation, unemployment, corruption, maladministration and social unrest. Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti is thus in the peculiar position of holding the Communists away while implementing an emergency plan of such a nature that he can count on those same Communists to support it.

The Communists have not only escaped from the political ghetto in which the Christian Democrats had for so long sought to pen them but they have already obtained enormous provincial and municipal power as well as national prestige and parliamentary influence.

One of their members is president of the lower house; seven committees in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies have Communist chairmen. But, excluded from a cabinet relying on their support, they will get credit for its successes while escaping blame for its failures.

Over thirty years the Communists have improved their electoral position by moving steadily upward from 18.9 percent of the vote to 34.4 percent in June while the Christian Democrats slid from a high of 48.5 percent in 1948 to 38.7 percent this year.

Enrico Berlinguer, the brilliant party leader, has been saying for months: "The Communist question can no longer be avoided. . . . The Italy of today cannot be governed without the Italian Communist party." It seems inevitable that some of Berlinguer's followers will eventually be given at least secondary posts in a coalition government based upon his vaunted formula, the "historical compromise."

Such a compromise, as he sees it, would unite all (except neo-Fascist) political factions in a "national" government, avoiding an open clash between right-wing and left-wing forces or the kind of left-alliance cabinet that would surely split Italy into two warring camps and very likely repeat the Chilean tragedy.

There is sharp division among Western leaders about the consequences of such an inclusive coalition government. Many agree with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who told me during the course of a very lengthy conversation that he was convinced

Italy's Communists would ape the Soviet Union's and that this "is predictable in any and all Communist revolutions: one thing is said before gaining power and another thing is done afterward."

"Before the [Bolshevik] revolution Lenin made many, many promises. He promised freedom of movement for everyone, an absence of censorship, peasant ownership of land, direct workers' control of industry." Solzhenitsyn stresses that not a single one of these pledges was honored, and concludes:

"The West deceives itself by thinking that this dictatorship stems from Russia's own past and that therefore the West is immune to the disease

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

'Berlinguer is being logical when he insists his party wishes to continue Italy's membership in NATO.'

because its own heritage is different. . . . I don't believe the statements of the French or Italian Communist Parties concerning their intentions. One must not forget that Lenin himself always used golden words before coming to power. But once he came to power he showed that he had a well-organized dictatorship run by an iron fist."

I have boundless admiration for Solzhenitsyn's geological courage and immense respect for his literary gifts but I think that because of his suffering and his experience only with the Soviet form of communism his views are oversimplified.

Personally, I have been impressed in long talks with Berlinguer and it seems to me he is being logical when he insists his party wishes at present to continue Italy's membership in NATO. Why is this logical, since NATO is patently a protective alliance aimed at only one principal adversary, the Communist Soviet Union?

The reason is that Berlinguer not only believes in developing a different form of socialism—with a democratic guarantees—in his country but also recognizes the very real possibility of a Soviet or pro-Soviet putsch in neighboring Yugoslavia some time after Tito's death.

And Berlinguer, in 1976, just like Tito in 1948, doesn't fancy the idea of a Soviet or Soviet-puppet neighbor for the independent Italy whose independent future he now, in one or another way, is helping to plan.

Near East

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
2 August 1976

The Empress reigns supreme

The Guardian has been in dispute with the Indian government over its coverage of the sub-continent since Mrs Gandhi declared the state of emergency last year. Brian Brooks, who has witnessed from Delhi many of the events of the past 13 months, gives his findings on the state of the country.

RESIDENTS of the old city of Delhi woke up on June 26 to find a strange spectacle. The Indian national flag fluttered from many lamp posts, and the elegant tricolour was found pasted on walls of schools and temples.

A slogan had been scrawled on the wall of a government building barely 200 yards from Akashvani Bhawan which houses the government-owned All India Radio: "Down with the Emergency! We will regain our freedom!"

Boys and girls emerged from the old city's bylanes shouting freedom slogans. By 10 am the protest against the state of national emergency, a year old on that day, was over. Not more than three hundred people were arrested in the capital. Reports from Gujarat State, which was ruled by the five-party opposition United Front party, until March 31, said about 2,500 passive resisters were arrested on the first anniversary of the emergency.

Calcutta and Bombay, the nation's two biggest cities, almost ignored the anniversary. Though underground sources claim that upwards of 35,000 anti-government demonstrators were arrested all over the country, qualified observers say that not more than 10,000 fresh dissidents have joined the estimated 125,000 held since June last year when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent the world's largest democracy to prison.

Mrs Gandhi and her advisers can take little comfort from the almost total collapse of the opposition's plans to mount an impressive nation-wide protest on June 26. When underground leaflets began to appear in early May urging the people to "demonstrate your will to be free," the Government took extraordinary precautions to quell any possible manifestations of public

anger. Some 5,000 additional policemen were moved into the capital from the adjoining states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. And hundreds of people suspected to be organising the June 26 protest were arrested all over the country.

"All these precautions were totally unnecessary," said a prominent journalist.

"Mrs Gandhi had already crushed all possible sources of resistance. And with the arrest of George Fernandez only a few days before the anniversary the underground was totally finished." Mr Fernandez, the top-ranking leader of the Socialist Party, had evaded arrest successfully for almost a year.

It was reported that he was betrayed by a party worker from Bihar who was working both for the police and pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI). The Government had set up a special 300-man police squad to hunt Mr Fernandez down, and a shoot-at-sight order was issued last August.

The underground could operate with some effect so long as the states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu were in the hands of opposition parties. Now, even clandestine leaflets are rarely to be seen. A senior official of the Government's Press Information Bureau told me. "We used to receive at least two leaflets a week all these months. At one stage, as many as 400 underground sheets were being produced from Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. The Home Minister himself has admitted in Parliament that in Delhi alone 7,000 people were arrested

for producing anti-Government literature. All that is finished now. The Empress reigns supreme!"

Most officials of the Lok Sangarsh Samiti or People's Committee For Struggle, which has been conducting the underground passive

resistance movement, are in prison. One of the dozen or so organisers still free told me recently in Madhya Pradesh State that about 1,500 underground workers have fled to Nepal.

Reports from Katmandu say that the Nepalese Government has rejected appeals from the Indian police to arrest and extradite members of the Indian underground. This is not so much because King Birendra has become a lover of democracy but because a sizeable number of his own political enemies have found shelter in India. The Indian Government is believed to have told Katmandu that it is prepared for an "exchange" of underground political workers but the Nepalese are apparently reluctant to forego this valuable leverage.

A source close to the Nepalese embassy said that Katmandu will never hand over to the Indian members of the Rashtriya Swayam Sangh (RSS), a Hindu right-wing body, banned by the Gandhi regime shortly after the promulgation of the emergency. The Nepalese royal family has been the traditional patrons of the RSS which regards Nepal as the only surviving Hindu monarchy in the world. King Birendra's father used to attend RSS rallies in various parts of India, causing considerable embarrassment to the late Prime Minister Nehru.

"The RSS continues to be active all over India," Brahmanand Reddy, the Indian Home Minister, said recently. "It has even extended its tentacles to far-off Kerala in the south... The capacity of the RSS for violent mischief is unlimited. We must be on our guard." But observers say that Mr Reddy is deliberately exaggerating the potentialities of the RSS in order to find another excuse to continue the emergency.

No visitor to India can fail to be impressed by the state of law and order. Samachar, the new nationalised news agency and the Government's major means of disseminating claims of instant progress, said in a long survey on June 26: "A year of emergency has hatched (sic) a new profile of India, a distinct profile in discipline, dedication and hard work... Never has the nation appeared more stable politically and viable economically... From a fate similar to the one that befell the

Fourth Republic of France, India was pulled back."

The Samachar report then went on to list the "hundred gains" ranging from land reforms to steel production and from coal to crime control and added: "Academics, intellectuals, petty officials, industrial workers, rickshaw pullers, indeed a cross section of the nation, told Samachar, 'Let the emergency continue indefinitely!'"

That evening a senior reporter of Samachar said to me at the Press Club: "Did you read our survey of the results of the emergency? The whole damned stuff was handed down to Lazarus (Wilfred Lazarus, the Samachar general manager) by the Press Information Bureau. Most of the claims made in the Samachar survey and other officially inspired surveys cannot stand even elementary scrutiny. But so severe is the press censorship that we have to circulate, and the newspapers have to print, what even a school boy knows to be exaggerated and false."

To find out whether this Samachar man had a private grouse against the Government, I drove to Jaunsar-Bawar, some 300 miles from Delhi, to verify claims that 16,000 bonded agricultural workers had been freed and provided with alternative jobs. All that I could gather was that only 80 of them had found new jobs. Said one former serf: "I was the virtual slave of a landlord for 30 years. He paid me hardly £25 for a whole year. But he also provided my family with free food. Now, I am a free man but can't find a job."

The Indian Express, the country's largest newspaper chain, reported from the south Indian state of Karnataka that 10 freed bonded slaves of Honganur village near the state capital "have opted for bondage again rather than enjoy the poverty of freedom." Later, a junior official of the censor's office rang up a senior editor of the Express to give him a piece of friendly advice:

"Look," he said, "we have no desire to stifle investigative journalism. But this kind of sensational-mongering is irresponsible." When the editor said that the report was based on authentic evidence, the official sharply retorted: "It is not enough for a report to be fraction-

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18, 1976

Indian Paper's Independence Threatened

By HENRY KAMM
Special to The New York Times

CALCUTTA, India — The Statesman, the last of India's English-language national dailies not yet completely dominated by the Government, is under intense Government pressure.

A court hearing scheduled for New Delhi on Aug. 20 may put the presses of the newspaper's New Delhi edition under Government control. The newspaper's corporate headquarters and largest edition are here.

The case is another in a series of Government moves since Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's declaration of a state of emergency last year threatening The Statesman's independence. It involves an order by the Government for the newspaper to show cause why its presses should not be forfeited because they served to print a recently closed monthly. The monthly Seminar, which ceased publication last month rather than accept a Government order to submit itself to censorship before publication, had no connection with The Statesman. It was printed on the newspaper's presses on a commercial basis.

Neither The Statesman nor Seminar had any warning before last month's censorship order. The order has not been violated since no issue of the magazine was printed following it.

Nonetheless, copies of the show-cause order were presented individually to the retired former chief justice of India, S. R. Das, who is chairman of the newspaper's board of directors, and to each board member.

The Statesman will contest

the Government order, as it has previous moves against it. They involved attempts by the Government to gain control of the newspaper through legal moves.

The first was an allegation that The Statesman had misused its newsprint. The second was a charge that the newspaper had wrongfully acquired majority control over a book-publishing concern some years ago. The third was confiscation of the passport of the newspaper's managing director, C. R. Irani, when he returned from a session of the Asian Press Institute in Hong Kong.

In the first two, the newspaper sought in the high court of the state of West Bengal to block the orders, contending that the legal moves were part of a Government design to gain control of the newspaper. The orders were issued, and the Government has not moved to have them rescinded. The Statesman believes that the Government is not prepared to fight the cases on the freedom-of-the-press issue.

Statesman Stands Alone

The newspaper's briefs alleged, with names, dates and places, a number of Government attempts to put pressure on The Statesman to fall into line. The contentions involve harassment in systematically delaying publication of the paper through censorship actions, direct demands to change news policy by the Information Minister, V.C. Shukla, and other officials, pressure on stockholders, and Government attempts to influence appointments of news executives.

The other English-language

newspapers, which have been the most influential in the country since the colonial period, are The Times of India, The Hindustan Times, The Indian Express and The Hindu. The Statesman is alone among them in restraining its enthusiasm for Mrs. Gandhi's measures; such enthusiasm has become the uniform standard of the once highly contentious press.

The Statesman is as bound by the rules issued for the Indian press, which prevent criticism of the "emergency" and its sweeping curtailment of civil rights, as are all newspapers. It does not criticize. But its regular readers find that the paper does not go out of its way to praise, as the others do.

Hindu Falls Into Line

Unlike its competitors, moreover, The Statesman does not give front-page prominence to all Government actions, important or not. The Statesman's policy is defined as accepting Government rules on what it must not print but reserving for itself the decision of how to present the news it is allowed to publish.

Of the other English-language national newspapers, The Hindu, published in Madras, fell into line quickly. The Times of India was in a difficult situation to resist because the Government, as a result of a pre-emergency court action for financial anomalies, has temporary control over one-third of the newspaper's stock and the high court in the state of Maharashtra, in Bombay, controls another third.

an accident that nowhere in the code does the word 'freedom' appear?"

According to one Bombay editor, censorship has not only become stricter each passing day but arbitrary and absurd. He gave one recent example, Vinod Rau, the local censor, rang him up one morning to say that henceforth Sanjay Gandhi should not be referred to as the Youth Congress Leader, the young man's popular designation hitherto. "Why?" asked the editor in sheer astonishment. "Has Sanjay ceased to be young or has he left the Congress?" The genial Mr. Rau, a former editor of the Indian Express, replied: "I do not know why New Delhi has issued this order. But my suspicion is that Sanjay has now become so famous that he does not need any designation."

The Government ordered a blackout of the recent press conference of Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, Mrs. Gandhi's chief political adversary, who was freed after four months in solitary confinement. The conference was called to announce the formation of a United Opposition Party to fight the next election, if and when it is held. But opposition politicians who are still free ask

built up when newspapers are forbidden to print a word about its preparatory work.

Opposition MPs strongly deny Mrs. Gandhi's recent charge that elections cannot be held because "the opposition is still thinking in terms of violence and chaos." Mr. Narayan is believed to have written a letter to Mrs. Gandhi saying that the opposition at no time believed in violent methods and that she is only finding new excuses to continue the emergency.

One MP said: "It is the Government which believes in violence. Can torture and harassment of prisoners be justified? George Fernandez's aged mother has written to President Ahmed describing how one of her sons was systematically tortured in order to ferret out information from him about George."

Will elections be held at all? Many Indians think that Mrs. Gandhi may call a poll early next year if the economy continues to improve and inflation-control measures are successful on a long-range basis. But with a good monsoon suddenly becoming uncertain and prices of essential articles going up again, there is doubt whether Varuna, the rain God, will favour Mrs. Gandhi.

But few Indians are prepared to agree that the next election can be free and fair. There is near-unanimity in intellectual circles from Kashmir in the north to Kerala in the far south that the series of constitutional changes the Congress Party has rammed through Parliament and the strangulation of the press have reduced democracy to a mere caricature.

Africa

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.
Friday, July 30, 1976

Responsibility and Rhodesia

It looks as if Mr. Kissinger's "Lusaka Statement" offering U.S. aid in toppling white-dominated Rhodesia was not just rhetoric. The Congress is now considering bills to put substance to the promises of the Secretary of State.

Mr. Kissinger proffered American economic aid to the "front-line" black African states to recompense them for part of their losses from boycotting Rhodesia. The International Security Assistance Act signed into law by President Ford late last month authorized \$25 million each for Zaire and Zambia and another \$20 million for "other southern Africa"—a cloyingly innocuous way of identifying the avowedly Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique.

While the authorization has passed, the appropriation is another matter. Anti-Communists on the Hill are sticking at supplying funds to Mozambique and Angola. Unfortunately, their scruples will probably have little effect; even if they block appropriations in the bills now under consideration, Mr. Kissinger can dip into other pockets for aid to the African Marxists. What is particularly significant about the current debate on the Hill is that aid to Zaire and Zambia has been almost non-controversial. Of course, these countries are friendly to the U.S., but the earmarking of aid funds for boycott indicates that Congress has accepted Mr. Kissinger's policy of "unrelenting pressure" on Rhodesia.

The other part of that pressure—repeal of the Byrd Amendment permitting importation of strategically important Rhodesian chrome—is being held in abeyance until after the Republican Convention. President Ford dare not annoy the conservatives before the nomination.

We wonder if the administration's policy is wise, regardless of one's views of what will happen in Rhodesia. If one believes that the Rhodesian system is likely to hold and will be superior to any candidate replacement, for the inhabitants and/or for the West, then the U.S. has no business trying to destroy it.

But if one agrees with the preponderance of informed opinion that white supremacy in Rhodesia is on the verge of overthrow, then it behoves the United States to use its good offices to ease the travail of

transition and to try to promote a replacement regime friendly to U.S. interests.

It is difficult to see how Mr. Kissinger's policy fits into either view. The survival of the settler regime will hardly be affected by U.S. policy, short of direct military intervention on either side. Barring major power intervention, the outcome will depend on the military competence and national will of the Rhodesians. What the U.S. aid will do is lend American moral support to the effort to settle the issue by force. Thus it gives the U.S. a certain responsibility for the outcome, without giving the U.S. a means of influencing it.

It is one thing, after all, to advise the white Rhodesians to try to make a deal to remain as a "white tribe" under a black government, but it is a far different matter to give overt assistance to attempts to overturn them. No one, no matter how well advised, can have any credible scenario of what happens to Rhodesia when the Smith regime goes. It could be a successful Katanga with a black government relying on white support, or another Kenya where a white community lives comfortably under a stable black government, or another Congo or Angola.

No American pressures or promises can assure a favorable outcome. Efforts to buy our way into new nationalist governments and thus exclude Soviet influence have rarely worked. Nor should the U.S. pretend to act as guarantor to a black government's assurances about the future of the white minority, since no one can be sure any given government would be around long enough to enforce such promises. The only direct American interest in Rhodesia is that we prefer to buy chromium there rather than from Russia. Whether we do or not will not affect the outcome, nor need it necessarily prevent our buying chromium from any successor regime, which will want to export.

Trying to influence the complexion of the next government may be a task appropriate for discreet work by our diplomats and intelligence services; we can offer mediation; but we should beware of assuming responsibility for the future of Rhodesia, lest we find ourselves caterers to another bloodbath.

NEW YORK TIMES

18 Aug. 1976

SOUTH AFRICA LINK TO ISRAEL GROWS

Closer Relations Reported
to Include the Delivery of
Military Materiel

By WILLIAM E. FARRELL

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Aug. 17—Israel's diplomatic and commercial ties to South Africa have increased dramatically in recent months in a strengthened relationship between the two countries that reportedly includes the sale of Israeli-manufactured military equipment.

While there is little hesitation on the part of Israeli officials to discuss the growing commercial trade between the two nations, these officials are reluctant to discuss the military transactions. Nevertheless, information has been seeping out in various quarters, including the foreign press and the Israeli radio. These disclosures include the following:

An Israeli radio report that Israel is building at its Haifa shipyard two long-range gun-boats armed with sea-to-sea missiles for the South African navy. Other accounts place the number of boats at six. The 420-ton boats cost about \$6 million without armaments. With missiles the cost is estimated at \$18 million a boat.

Reports that about 50 South African naval personnel, on temporary civilian status, are training in the Tel Aviv area to man the missile boats, with the expectation that the first of the vessels will be ready in January.

Unconfirmed reports that the sales agreement with South Africa includes delivery of up to two dozen Israeli-built Kfir jet planes.

Reports that in exchange for South African raw materials, including an estimated one million tons of coal a year to buoy the Israeli steel industry, the Israelis would provide South Africa with advanced military electronic equipment.

Israeli officials are loath to discuss the reported military aspects of the exchanges between the two countries because of South Africa's pariah status among many nations and particularly because of criticism expected in the United States from such quarters as the black Congressional caucus and from liberal American-Jewish groups.

The Israeli Government has long opposed Prime Minister John Vorster's racial policies and any inquiries concerning Israel's current dealings with South Africa elicit a re-affirmation of that opposition.

Mr. Vorster visited Israel in April, the first such visit by a

WASHINGTON STAR
10 AUG 1976

Frelimo Battles Capitalism

By Tony Avirgan
Special to The Washington Star

MAPUTO, Mozambique — There is a belief throughout Africa, a legacy of the colonial past with its inevitable racism, that says black Africans by their very nature can never be Communists. The rulers of Mozambique are out to prove this belief wrong.

They are creating a revolutionary state right on the borders of white minority-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa.

Since the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) came to power a little over a year ago, the watchword has been "aluta continua" (the struggle continues).

Mozambique still is on a war footing, but the fight now is to achieve economic independence, crush the bourgeoisie and create a "workers' and peasants' state."

LIGHT POLES on the wide boulevards in Maputo — the new name for Mozambique's capital — used to carry beer signs. Now they support colorful banners declaring war on capitalism, imperialism and racism.

Waiters no longer refer to customers as "sir" or "madame." Everyone now is "comradá."

But the Mozambican revolution goes far deeper.

The plan is to use as a model for the entire country the "liberated zones," areas that were controlled by Frelimo during the war against Portugal. They are in the north and center of the country, and Frelimo wants to spread their influence to the south and to the cities.

In the liberated zones people live an egalitarian, puritanical work-centered existence. Villagers till the fields for the benefit of all. Literacy and health are stressed as a part of every person's revolutionary duty. Progress has been made in changing the role of women from that of traditional African society.

FRELIMO officials say one of their big concerns just now is maintaining the integrity of these liberated zones, that they are in danger of being "polluted" through the return of more than 50,000 refugees who had fled to Tanzania and Zambia.

Radicalization and mobilization of the population outside the liberated zones is another major concern. The long-range plan was that this would be accomplished over a period of years as the war against Portugal spread to include the entire country.

But the 1974 coup in Portugal that toppled Lisbon's right-wing government cleared the way for a quicker end to the war. Frelimo found itself in

possession of something it hadn't sought, the high-rise urban centers that Frelimo President Samora Machel recently described as "the haven of the bourgeoisie."

In February, the Frelimo central committee declared the nationalization of all rented and abandoned properties. The decree said compensation would go only to those who had not recovered their original investment in rent.

OFFICIALS still are not sure exactly what they nationalized. A survey team has been going from house to house in Maputo (formerly Lourenco Marques) to determine which properties had been abandoned and which had been rented.

Tenants remain, but their rent now goes to the state.

Other nationalizations in the first year of independence covered all land, all schools, hospitals and clinics, as well as the banning of private practice of medicine and law and of funeral parlors, which Machel said practice "commerce in death."

The foundation of Frelimo's politicization campaign is a vast network of "groupes dinamizadores" (dynamizing groups) in neighborhoods, villages and work places. Every citizen is encouraged to attend.

The groups serve multiple functions, including the political education, implementation of party directives and such practical matters as making sure streets are kept clean.

FRELIMO IS engaged in "class warfare," a struggle that inevitably will result in the alienation of previously privileged segments of the population.

White residents of Mozambique were given the option of taking Mozambican or Portuguese citizenship. Ninety percent of the 200,000 whites left rather than accept the loss of privilege demanded by Frelimo.

Observers believe about half of the 20,000 remaining will leave eventually, but they are different from those who fled earlier, who often were outright racists and staunch anti-Communists.

One young man who will leave for Portugal shortly said, "I really think that what Frelimo is doing is the best thing for this country. I wanted to help but I found that I had been raised in too privileged a life. I found that I wasn't strong enough to change, so its best that I leave."

Black opponents of Frelimo who did not flee, including several thousand former members of Portugal's colonial army, now are in "re-education" camps in the countryside.

WASHINGTON POST
31 JUL 1976

- State Department spokesman Robert L. Funes said yesterday that the department "categorically denies" a report in The Washington Post yesterday that the United States, Britain and Kenya are cooperating to overturn the Uganda government of President Idi Amin.

East Asia

Los Angeles Times Thurs., August 12, 1976

Philippine Nationalism Becoming More Popular at Cost of Old Ties With U.S.

BY JACQUES LESLIE

Times Staff Writer

MANILA--For many years after the Philippines was granted independence in 1946, the island nation almost slavishly aped the policies of its former colonial master, the United States.

During that period a leading Filipino historian warned: "We are equating America's national interest with ours . . . It is . . . easy to persuade us into believing that some action which is best for America is actually best for us."

Philippine foreign policy was so determinedly anti-Communist, for example, that the nation did not even establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until two months ago. When the United States confronted the Soviet Union and Cuba in the 1962 missile crisis, the Philippines promptly suspended relations with Cuba.

In recent years, however, many Filipinos have begun to question this unbending pro-Washington attitude. The assertion of Philippine nationalism at the expense of American interests always was favored by a minority of Filipino politicians known as "nationalists." Given impetus by the collapse of pro-American governments in Indochina last year, the nationalists' objectives are becoming more and more popular.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos increasingly appeals to nationalist sentiment. His most dramatic move was to announce more than a year ago that the United States would have to renegotiate the agreement that allowed it to operate two major military bases here rent-free. Negotiations for a new bases pact have been under way since June 15 without any firm results.

A year ago, Marcos went to Peking to establish diplomatic relations with China, and at the same time condemned big-power hegemony in Asia. The Philippines last month agreed on relations with a unified Vietnam, a nation which Washington refuses to recognize.

In economic policy, the disenchantment which some Filipinos feel toward the United States was reflected in the lapse in 1974 of the Laurel-Langley agreement that had been in effect since Philippine independence. It was based on the assumption that since the Philippine economy immediately after independence was still dependent on the United States, Philippine exports would be given preferential treatment in America in return for lucrative terms for U.S. investment in the Philippines.

Many Filipinos came to resent the benefits offered U.S. investors here, and the United States did not object when no effort was made to renew the agreement before its expiration in 1974.

At the same time, the Philippine Supreme Court provoked the ire of some U.S. investors by ruling that the lapse of the Laurel-Langley agreement meant that its provisions retroactively had no validity.

To U.S. investors who had bought land based on Laurel-Langley's assurance that they could never be forced to divest, this was a telling blow. The Supreme Court decision required the investors to sell their land.

Since then the Marcos government has increasingly pressured foreign investors to accept lower percentages of ownership in business.

"The whole tenor here has been of a more nationalistic application of economic policy," a Western economist said.

Opposition politicians here are still skeptical about the depth of Marcos' commitment to nationalist aims. "Since last year, when he went to Red China, he has tried to preempt all the nationalist issues, here," said an opposition

politician who asked not to be identified. "But what makes it very clearly superficial is that he keeps on begging for foreign investment and loans."

In 1975, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank approved loans to the Philippines worth \$200 million. U.S. economic aid in fiscal 1976 was \$81 million, and American AID planners are asking Congress for a \$106 million appropriation in fiscal 1977. American investment in the Philippines is estimated at \$1.5 billion.

Growing Phillipine preoccupation with nationalism seems to indicate a feeling that decades of cultural domination by the United States have deprived the nation of pride in its culture. Renato Constantino, professor at the University of the Philippines, wrote in a sardonic essay that the Filipino:

"Has shown his discriminating taste by being receptive only to American culture, selecting for avid consumption such outstanding American contributions as cowboy movies, horror pictures, comics, rock and roll, soapbox derbies, beauty contests, teen-age idiosyncrasies, advertising jingles, cocktail parties, and soft drinks."

The depth of American influence is apparent even in the countryside surrounding Manila, where the lush, green land is punctuated with Pepsi-Cola advertisements and U.S.-brand gas stations. Basketball nets, symbols of the Filipinos' favorite sport, tower over muddy fields.

To be sure, some observers run counter to the nationalistic trend by arguing that one reason for the Americans' success in dominating Philippine culture is the absence of a great traditional civilization here. Before it was colonized by Spain and then the United States, the Philippines consisted of largely autonomous tribes which were spread over some of the nation's 7,000 islands. They left behind no artistic monuments like those which have come to symbolize national greatness in other Asian countries such as Indonesia and India.

"Marcos is trying to create national pride," a Western diplomat said, "but Filipinos feel their lack of any great civilization or culture."

To many observers, the key to instilling national pride is language. In colonial days, the Americans allowed only English to be taught in schools. English spread across the nation, which had been divided by the presence of 87 indigenous languages. Between 30% and 40% of the people now speak English.

"In exchange for a smattering of English, we yielded our souls," Prof. Constantino argued. "The stories of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln made us forget our own heritage. The American view of our history (taught in schools in the colonial period) turned our heroes into brigands in our own eyes, distorted our vision of our future."

In addition, few Filipinos learned English perfectly, and many thus suffered from being unable to speak any language articulately. But now Tagalog, spoken by 56% of the population, is enjoying a resurgence. Long ago declared the Philippines' national language, its use in universities is finally challenging that of English.

Some observers believe the anti-Americanism now prevalent here reflects the negative side of many Filipinos' long-standing love-hate feelings for the United States. Taught to accept American values as their own during colonial rule, many Filipinos are anxious for acceptance and sensitive to slights from the United States.

This preoccupation with American treatment is current-

BALTIMORE SUN
3 August 1976

Thailand's Foreign Investment Lag

By FRANK LOMBARD

Bangkok.

The Thai government is becoming concerned about a drop-off in foreign investment. Foreign as well as local investment began to tumble as communist forces took over the neighboring Indochina states of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in mid-1975.

Total foreign and domestic investment in 1974 was running \$450 million, 30 per cent of it foreign. In 1975, it was down to \$75 million, 15 per cent of it foreign.

Applications for firms enjoying tax privileges were submitted at a rate of about 20 a month in 1974, 10 a month in 1975, and are now running at only 5 a month. These numbers apply only to initial registered capital and do not account for reinvestment. Nevertheless, even though better figures are hard to come by, the feeling here is that the foreign investor is losing interest in Thailand.

At a recent panel discussion at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, a group of overseas business men aired their doubts. They were unanimous in agreeing that investor confidence in Thailand was shaken by the demise of the Indochina states and the fear that Thailand would become the next domino.

Japan is Thailand's leading investor, with the U.S. second. The Japanese member of the panel said that his country's investment in Thailand was down to a third of its 1974 value, while worldwide Japanese investment was about the same. He attributed this to political unrest.

The panel tended to be bullish on Thailand, maybe because the members have much at stake. The American representative played down the "investment follows the flag" concept and said he felt that the American military withdrawal would have little effect on the American investor. "Business tends to be apolitical," he said. "The presence of the troops does not affect the ability to generate a profit."

The German member of the panel felt that the withdrawal would change investment calculations. "Instead of getting your capital back in 5 years, you might want it back in 3 years," he remarked.

The panel was critical of the press. Members felt that outsiders are getting a wrong

impression of the situation in Thailand. They are continuously getting strange queries from their home offices, where executives are convinced that Thailand is in a state of chaos and collapse.

The blame for sensationalizing spot news stories fell on far-away editors, who lack perspective on the local situation. Examples were the recent ransacking of the Prime Minister's residence by a mob of drunken policemen and an incident in which 50 armed bandits, some of them policemen, held up a Bangkok-bound express train and sprayed it with automatic gunfire.

Such occurrences evince little surprise among those who live in Bangkok, where chaos is normal and does not necessarily imply instability.

All in all, Thailand's economic pulse is healthy. Inflation was 12 per cent in 1974

Banditry evinces little surprise among those who live in Bangkok, where chaos is normal and does not necessarily imply instability.

and only 5 per cent in 1975. The Thai currency is stable. The black market price has never fluctuated more than 10 per cent from the controlled rate despite reports that some \$35 million has illegally fled the country in the past year. International reserves dropped by about 20 per cent in the latter part of 1975, partly due to the American withdrawal, but they have lately turned around. Thailand was recently granted a 100-million-Eurodollar loan.

In the April 1976 issue of *Euromoney*, a banker's journal printed in London, Thailand's investment prospects were analyzed. The magazine described the present democratic Thai government as "an uneasy experiment." (Military governments have been the norm.) It said the government was corrupt and chaotic and has been insensitive to

the needs of the rural sector, at least until recently. It characterized the Democratic party, which rules the present fairly stable coalition, as capitalist and royalist. The socialist opposition is weak and the Communist party is banned, all of which is good news for investors.

"If there is a military coup, it might encourage foreign investment," the magazine said. "However, it will also encourage the communist insurgents and result in a longer-term shift to the left."

Many observers in Bangkok feel that if Thailand is to go communist, it will probably fall from the inside. No one is really expecting an invasion. There are close to 10,000 armed, uniformed insurgents operating in this nation of 40 million, and there are probably an equal number of unarmed cadre. Their ranks are increasing at a rate of about 10 per cent a year. On the other hand, the population is growing by 3.2 per cent a year, and the number of armed criminals far exceeds the number of communists. There is no gun control, and the murder rate is 4 times that of the U.S.

Communist terrorists act on principle alone and save their bullets for the police, the army, and corrupt officials. No business man has been molested. No capital equipment has been damaged. Intelligence sources say the communists get their money from a Bangkok-based underground and buy their weapons on the Thai black market. Serial-number checks have not shown any substantial surplus American weapon movements from Vietnam to Thailand.

Ideological and training support for Thai insurgents come from Hanoi and Peking. This is unlikely to stop, since the communists consider it a party and not a government affair.

The communist threat is serious but a long way from being fatal. The Thais may or may not find a solution, but in the meantime, there is money to be made in a country where the minimum wage is \$1.25 per day, corporate balance sheets can be kept from the public scrutiny and tax evasion is a national sport.

Mr. Lombard is an American freelance journalist based in Bangkok.

ly reflected in the massive publicity here being given the trial of two Filipina nurses in Michigan accused of murdering five of their patients. The nurses are often portrayed as the innocent victims of a U.S. campaign to malign the Philippines.

On the other hand, a large pool of goodwill for America still exists. The high level of emigration to the United States shows this: last year alone, there were 33,000 who emigrated.

One impetus to anti-Americanism probably has been Marcos' four-year-old martial law regime, which has engendered some disillusionment with U.S. policy. "The U.S. brought Filipinos up to believe in democracy," complained a professor here, "but when Marcos suspended democratic methods, the U.S. continued to support him."

Latin America

NEW YORK TIMES
25 July 1976

Small New Countries in the Caribbean Are Starting to Follow Cuba's Example

By The Associated Press

PORT OF SPAIN, Trinidad—The small emerging nations of the Caribbean are moving to the left, and the pace is accelerating.

In the years since Fidel Castro introduced radical socialism to the area, eight former British and Dutch territories there have gained full independence. Six other island-states expect independence within the next decade.

The new nations inherited multiparty systems of government, but left-wing politicians now either are in power in nearly all of the 14 countries, share it, or are in powerful opposition.

In interviews, many of these leaders saw the Cuban model of social and economic planning as a real alternative to American-style capitalist democracy, and as a way to solve their problems.

Many leaders in the British Caribbean came to power espousing one form of socialism or another, usually of the mild British variety. "They were all parlor Socialists," said a Western diplomat disparagingly. Once in power, however, even the moderates found themselves pushed to the left.

Violence in Jamaica

Virtual communism has come to Guyana, and the introduction of radical socialism has been violently resisted in Jamaica. Leaders in the emerging island-states of Dominica and St. Vincent seem convinced that Marxism will be their best ideological course when they gain independence soon.

And common to the Caribbean today is the trend toward the nationalization or partial takeover of America's \$6 billion in business investments.

Helping to polarize the political leaders are the apparently intractable social and economic problems that they believe are impervious to other than radical solutions.

"Capitalism has been in operation in this part of the world for some time and it has failed us," Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana said in an interview. His view was echoed by others interviewed in the Caribbean, and they cited the following overriding problems:

• Unemployment—Populations have multiplied. The island of Barbados, for instance, one-fifth the size of Jacksonville, Fla., has a population of 243,000 with 30 percent of the work force unemployed. Similar unemployment figures are found among the rest of the Caribbean's 15 mil-

lion people, with high densities in capitals such as Kingston, Jamaica; Port of Spain, Trinidad, and Georgetown, Guyana. Crime levels are high as a result.

• Emigration cutoff—Emigration to the parent colonial country once was a safety valve, but Britain and the Netherlands have reduced the traffic. Canada is also slackening its intake, and only the United States is continuing to absorb migrants in great numbers. The annual quota for the Western Hemisphere is 120,000 and many of these emigrants come from the Caribbean. Jamaica, with only one half of one percent of the hemisphere's population, last year provided 10 percent of the quota—12,000 immigrants.

• Decline of plantations—The traditional sugar and banana plantation economies continue to decline because of poor world prices and the reluctance of the newly independent islanders to work in the fields. "They continue to equate hard work with slavery," said a Government official in Guyana.

• Failure of federation—The best hope for the viability of the Caribbean islands was believed to be in federation. Britain found that newly independent Trinidad, Guyana, Barbados and Jamaica were unwilling to pull together. Federation has failed even in the tiniest islands. The Associated State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, with only 60,000 people on three small islands, has already split into two parts and may soon split into three. A similar pattern is showing up in the Netherlands Antilles. Various economic federations have been attempted, but even the Caribbean Common Market, the most hopeful indicator of economic cooperation, seems destined to fail because of traditional island rivalries.

Measured against this gloomy political and economic performance, Cuba, the largest of the Caribbean states, with nine million people. Using techniques of complete social planning and authoritarian control, Prime Minister Castro is reported to have thoroughly transformed Cuba, pouring 30 per cent of the gross national product into development, and providing free nursery schools, medical care and education to university level.

That Mr. Castro made these achievements with around \$2 million a day in Soviet aid and at the expense of free institutions has not dismayed his Caribbean admirers. His example seems to be catching on.

Setting the pace is Guyana, formerly British Guiana, on the northeast shoulder of South America. Foreign business has been nationalized and the country's 800,000 people have been mobilized along Marxist-Leninist lines. "Guyana will have moved into being a fairly orthodox Communist country in four or five years," an experienced observer there said.

Guyana has entered a rare period of political serenity. Cheddi Jagan, the political opposition leader and bitter Marxist opponent of Prime Minister Burnham, has worked with the Government in completing the Marxist structure of the Minnesota-sized country.

Manley Turned to Left

Jamaica, at the end of a chain of sparkling islands and 1,200 miles to the northeast, is one-twentieth of Guyana's size but has three times the population. A sudden turn toward radical socialism by Prime Minister Michael Manley after he visited Cuba last year shocked the conservative opposition party and led to charges of Communist influences in Jamaica. There were countercharges of involvement of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency. The popular Mr. Manley is expected to win the approaching elections and to resume his leftward march.

In Barbados, Prime Minister Errol Walton Barrow allowed Angola-bound Cuban planes to refuel there.

Trinidad is the most stable of the small islands, with Prime Minister Eric Williams, a moderate, bolstered in power by rich new finds of petroleum off his southwestern coast. Mr. Williams visited Cuba last year.

but has since voiced disapproval of Mr. Castro's foreign adventures.

The Bahamas is another center of stability. The Government there has resisted overtures from Cuba, but has expressed interest in nationalizing some local industries, including the gambling casinos.

A 'Golden Handshake'

Surinam gained its independence from the Netherlands eight months ago, receiving a "golden handshake" in the form of a \$1.7 billion aid package from The Hague. Western diplomats say the "medium-term" prospects for Surinam and its 300,000 people are excellent. But they warn that there is a strong leftist trend in the powerful labor movement of this South American neighbor of Guyana, and say it could eventually radicalize the Government and endanger large American bauxite interests.

The five British Associated States in the Windward and Leeward Islands yield authority in defense and foreign affairs to London, but retain full internal power. The Governments are either left wing or have radical politicians in coalitions. They are expected to accept independence within the next few years.

Edward Bruma, the left-wing Minister of Economics in Surinam, was asked what future American policy might be: "The United States will have to learn to live with people who have different political systems. We learned to live with the atom bomb; America will have to learn to live with a Socialist Caribbean."

The United States Government has told leaders in Jamaica and Guyana that it is concerned less about their form of government than the potential subversive influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union on Caribbean affairs. Local officials scoff at this potential threat.

THE WASHINGTON POST

7 August 1976

• The Cuban Communist Party newspaper *Granma* accused the CIA and the opposition Jamaican Labor Party of a "wide ranging plan of destabilization" against the Jamaican government of Prime Minister Michael Manley, which has intensified contacts with Cuba.